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In 1981 as a bewildered third former I marched up Queen Street in Auckland 
to protest against the Springbok tour. 
At the time I knew it was for the better good, yet the next day at rugby 
practise I had trouble explaining why. Sporting contacts with South Africa has 
been a source of curiosity ever since, hence my reason for choosing a 
South African tour debate. 1970 was chosen for the simple reason that other 
major controversial tours have been done and, as it happened the 1970 
issue turned out to be a crucial year for New Zealand and South African 
sporting relations. It was a learning and enjoyable study. 
In writing this essay I must acknowledge the help I received from different 
quarters. To my supervisor John Omer-Cooper whose ideas and advice 
helped make my confused thoughts coherent, and to my typist Linda Bell, 
for her patience in transforming illegible handwriting into quality text. To this 
years fourth year class who taught me as much about interpreting my 
environment as any history course, and to Pam, Wendy, Paul and Mike for 
absorbing my stress and keeping me happy. And finally to the needy 
support and encouragement from my parents, Joanna and Bob, who 
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Chapter One 
RUGBY, RACE AND REACTION 
Introduction 
1969 and 1970 were interesting years in New Zealand. From the comfort of 
living rooms folk watched on television the US Intrepid landing on the moon. 
From the same chair they saw massive and violent demonstrations in 
America protesting against United States involvement in Vietnam. By driving 
into town they witnessed unrest at home as university students marched 
down the main street for similar reasons. In 1969 New Zealand celebrated 
the bi-centenary of Captain Cook's first visit. The Dominion printed Cook's 
diary day by day while in Gisborne they re-enacted his discovery. In late 
November the National party was returned to office by the narrow margin 
of four seats and Prime Minister, Holyoake continued for another term. 1970 
saw the arrival of Queen Elizabeth IL the Duke of Edinburgh, Prince Charles 
and Princess Anne. New Zealand had prepared for months for this royal tour 
which received front page status for its duration. 
And most importantly in 1970 the All Blacks were invited to play South 
Africa, a tour considered more significant than the first tour ever made.l 
By 1970 a new social pattern was emerging distinctly different from 
yesteryear. The 1960's has had a profound social impact on New Zealand 
tending away from conformity, uniformity and simplicity and steering toward 
diversity, complexity and change. Society began to question aspects of 
New Zealand's character that had previously gone unchallenged. The 
rising youth counter culture in protest to Vietnam was in part an expression of 
this re-evaluation. 
Major cities expanded as home ownership lay at the heart of the 
prevailing ethos. Occupational mobility was given new life and New 
Zealand moved into line with America becoming a while-collar society, with 
jobs totalling 41% of all occupations. Although farming still remained the 
single largest occupation and the country's biggest earner. And irregularities 
in wealth, expressed through conspicuous consumption of material goods 
1 The Dominion Oct 101969, p1; Oct 16 1969 pl Col; 5-7 Oct 17 1969 pl Col3-7; Nov 20 1969 
pl; Dec 11969 pl Col1-3, March 12 1970 pl col 5-7; June 13 1970 p.60 col1-4 The Listener 
July 25 1969 Vol61 No. 1554 p.3. 
/' 
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had developed, eroding New Zealand's proud egalitarian myth.2 
Despite these changes to the social fabric many New Zealand norms 
remained resistent to change particularly aspects of New Zealand's male 
culture. Rugby, the first pillar of this male stereotype (the other two being 
• .... racing and beer") was questioned and weakened but did not lose its 
place. To appreciate the debate in this essay on understanding of rugby 
union and the place it held in New Zealand society is vital. 
Rugby, considered the 'best medium of expression for New Zealand 
nationalism'3 was first played in New Zealand on 14 May 1870 in Nelson, and 
since has been enthusiastically embraced by New Zealand males. 
It took root in New Zealand early as it fitted the values of a pioneer 
male culture, and encouraged the less desirable elements of it- fighting, 
drinking and swearing. Before rugby became civilised the game 
resembled a disorganised melee of an undetermined number of players, 
brutally wrestling for a ball and frequently degenerated into a pugilistic 
scramble. The respectable classes disliked what they saw and by 1892 
formed the New Zealand Rugby Football Union (NZRFU) and imposed 
upon the game strict laws and order.4 The game was transformed into an 
exercise extolling the virtues of civilised gentlemen. It graduated from an 
undisciplined leisure-time pursuit to a vital necessity. As New Zealand 
became a nation of urban dwellers, deep concerns were raised over the 
stature and physical strength of the male populous. Town life would deprive 
men of the physical capacities once found in the backblocks which were 
so crucial to the male identity. The material luxuries of urban life were 
making men soft and effeminate. Muscular sports like rugby were needed 
to re-instill a threatened male virility.s As late as 1970 these fears of urban 
effeminacy were still prevalent. 
The welfare state and the comforts of modern living are 
producing a softer breed - less inclined towards the hard grind 
of rugby and more inclined towards the solo skills of other winter 
pastimes.6 
2 G. Dunstan, Geehom "The Social Pattern" Oxford History of New Zealand Chapter 5, 
pp397- 429 
3 G. Slatter, On the Ball p.362 
4 J. Phillips, A Man's Country? p.94-97 
5 Thid, p.97 -99 
6 Slatter, p.361 
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Rugby was strictly the preserve of males. It was considered the 
"manliest" sport having no place for girls or 'cissies', and has successfully 
perpetuated the bawdy male culture of drinking swearing and violence. 
>~ On the field respect is accorded for toughness, sublime commitment and 
the denial of pain Foul play was frowned upon, but those who "sorted it 
out", admired. Off the field, the association between beer-drinking and 
rugby has flourished at all levels. After games copious quantities of beer is 
swilled while singing bawdy songs, telling dirty stories, physical ribbing and 
occasionally the wanton destruction of property were sources of 
amusement. Swearing was prolific and became more violent with 
intoxication. Within the male preserve of rugby, women had no place and 
through chauvinistic practises and unwritten rules, administrators and 
players aimed to keep it that way. 
Rugby, it was maintained, taught the necessary skills for life hard work, 
determination, working for the larger good, and personal discipline. 
Throughout the twentieth century the New Zealand rugby team, the All 
Blacks have served to exemplify and also reinforce the value system of 
New Zealand men. All Blacks became role models and boys saw manifest 
in them the ideal New Zealand male. 7 The glorious aura created by the 
1905 All Blacks, whose outstanding victories over Britain did so much for New 
Zealand's embryonic self confidence, was maintained by consecutive All 
r, Black teams for the next 70 years. They were more then a rugby team. The 
': All Blacks travelled as the showcase of New Zealand national development 
and functioned as a barometer of the nations health. a 
I 
'I 
If the All Blacks stood above all else important, individual players 
stood higher, assuming a mythical status. During the 1960's and early 1970's 
Colin Meads was the greatest of them all. A farmer from the rugged King 
Country, Meads had .... 
a massive frame, hammerlike head, tall muscular legs and 
talonlike hands which could hold the ball aloft in one grasp.9 
He was hard and unremitting- reluctant to yield. His physical strength 
being superhuman. In the field of play Meads was uncompromising but in 
the comfort of his home he was gentle and modest, and a family man. His 
7 Phillips, p.109 
8 Thid, p.lll 
9 Thid, p.l20 
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stereotype was the finest personification of the New Zealand male. 
Of particular note in understanding this essay is the rugby relationship 
between New Zealand and South Africa. As both countries belonged to the 
Commonwealth it is not surprising that rugby found its way from Britain to the 
veldt of Southern Africa where it is was adopted with even more vigour 
than in New Zealand. Of all international encounters, those between the All 
Blacks and Springboks were the most highly rated by both countries. Hence 
it need hardly be said the two nations have a respected rivalry for each 
other. The results bear this out. Of seven series between 1921 - 1965 two have 
been drawn, New Zealand has won two and South Africa has won three, 
having achieved the only series victory on foreign soil. Gordon Slatter in his 
centenary book of New Zealand Rugby On the Ball describes the intensity 
of rivalry that exists -
So intense has been the rivalry between New Zealand and 
South Africa that a whole series of tour tests may be decided by 
one wheeled serum on the line or one dropped goal on the 
twenty five. One could never say that in these tests tries are 
handed about like Christmas cards. Thousands of people lose 
all sense of proportion when a tour is taking place. Players are 
spiritually prepared for the ultimate sacrifice of patriotism. It 
would be far better for them, for all of us, when given to frantic 
boast and foolish word, to recall the sane and simple 
statement of Phillip Nel, Captain of South Africa's greatest 
Springboks. He said that test matches are not won by guile or 
strength or speed. They are won on mistakes.lo 
One only needs gloss over biographies of All Blacks who have 
played South Africa to see this rivalry reiterated time and again. 
Everyone could play rugby. Unlike Britain where wealth or schooling 
determined opportunity, the structure of New Zealand's rugby fraternity 
reflected egalitarian values. The drain layer could well lock the serum with 
the local practitioner and during the game or socially afterward, little is 
made of it. Rugby in this way transcended the barriers of ethnicity, class and 
religion. 
Maoris quickly adopted rugby with a similar passion. It was one area 
where Maori and Pakeha participated on an equal basis. They played -
unique, open, uninhibited brand of football which is preserved through the 
formation of a New Zealand Maoris team. Maori representation at national 
level had remained prominent from the beginning and Maori All Blacks such 
10 Slatter, p. 355 
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as George Nepia, Charlie Smith, Mac Herewini, Tiny Hill and Nake Nathan 
ranked as some of the finest All Blacks to wear the sacred jersey.ll 
The prominence rugby held was unsurpassed. Frequently rugby in 
New Zealand was likened to a religion by resident and visiting observers. 
When challenging for the Ranfurly Shield, a trophy contested amongst 
provincial unions, whole towns would stop, when international matches were 
played, the whole country would stop. When asking middle aged citizens 
what vivid memories 1956 hold, few would deny the epic Springbok tour of 
New Zealand. Great All Blacks often held more mana than political 
statesmen, and during winter rugby occupied the front and back pages of 
newspapers and with television, monopolised whole afternoons with live 
coverage. Rugby, rightly or wrongly, remained in 1970 the undisputed 
national sport of New Zealand. 
Further to understanding a debate of apartheid and sport is a need 
to outline briefly the extent of New Zealand's race relations. Over the 
decade 1960 - 1970 important changes occurred concerning Maori-
Pakeha relations. Up until the late 1950's New Zealand considered itself, and 
was recognised as, a model for race relations in the developed world. 
However from around 1960 onwards this accepted notion, which New 
Zealand flaunted proudly to other countries, came under scrutiny, revealing 
racial problems extending well beneath the surface. Two major factors are 
responsible for exposing these ills to the Pakeha majority. The Hunn Report 
and Urbanisation. 
In 1961 a report by Jack Hunn on the Department of Maori Affairs was 
submitted to the government and was later published. In it, Hunn identifies 
areas of Maori inequality within New Zealand. Eye opening disparities in 
housing, educational attainment, employment and income were revealed 
and conclusions providing remedies to needy areas, offered. Hunn saw 
the scale of activities for the Department of Maori affairs as 
'not nearly large enough to cope with the explosive growth of 
population ..... Relatively the Department is falling behind and 
needs to redouble it activities' .12 
The report identified housing and education as the two best 
11 Ibid, p.169 - 170 




measures "calculated to equip the Maori to compete on equal terms" .13 
Urbanisation of Maoris was inevitable and was 'actively nurtured' thus 
preventing a 'colour problem' arising.14 Urbanisation correlated closely with 
Hunn's policy of "integration". He said of it -
Official policy can accelerate or retard, but not thwart or divert, 
the process of self determination. Evolution governs policy, not 
vice versa .... Evolution is clearly integrating Maori and Pakeha 
consequently integration is said to be the official policy 
whenever the question is asked. 15 
He intended "integration" to mean -
To combine (not fuse) the Maori and Pakeha elements to form 
one nation wherein Maori culture remains distinct.16 
Hunns' recommendations became the basis of National's policy in 
the 1960's. To meet the shortfall in housing the Government determined to 
provide state houses and simultaneously encourage integration by 
"pepper potting" Maori families among Pakeha communities. In education 
a Maori Education Foundation was set up to aid Maori pupils through the 
secondary and tertiary levels. 
The Hunn Report was a Pakeha administrators report based on 
pragmatic Pakeha philosophies, offering Pakeha answers to Maori 
problems.17 The central policy of integration (which Hunn admits could be 
the stepping stone before assimilation, to the demise of Maoritanga) was 
rejected by Maoris who claimed Hunn took a shallow view of Maori culture 
overlooking "the basic and ingrained personality traits that make a Maori a 
Maori".18 Hunn, as with most Pakeha's failed to perceive the strong Maori 
desire for a separate cultural identity. Despite rejection from Maoridom, the 
Hunn Report was useful in drawing attention to Maori needs and illuminating 
the yawning disparities that existed between Maori and Pakeha. 
Urbanisation also enhanced Pakeha awareness of Maori needs, 
Between 1961 and 1971 the percentage of Maori population living in urban 
13 Ibid 
14 1hl.d 
15 Ibid. p.17 
16 .Ibid 





areas increased by 24.2% rising from 46.0% to 70.2%.19 The net effect of this 
post war urbanisation reduced the social separation of Maori and Pakeha. 
Close quartered living brought before Pakeha's serious shortfalls in the 
system especially for the young urban Maori. It highlighted Maori/Pakeha 
educational imbalances: Professor J.E. Ritchie quoted 91% of Maoris left 
school without qualifications compared to 58% of pakehas2o. And high crime 
rates: one in four male arrest cases was Maori in 1965 21 These and other 
social problems of unemployment and housing were symptomatic of an 
inadequate bureaucracy and Maori social dislocation, with heightened 
concerns over the maintenance of Maori identity. 22 
Through deliberate re-establishment of urban morae structures and 
the emergence of a culturally strong Maori youth movement, Maori 
heritage within cities was successfully fostered. Urban Maori ignored Hunn's 
"pepper potting· policy and settled together in concentrated areas like 
Otara, Mangere and Te Atatu in Auckland and Porirua in Wellington. These 
groupings then set about re-building urban morae structures which served 
as the focal point of the community.23 It provided a forum for: 
continuing the concept of Maoritanga so second 
generation city born Maoris can imbibe in their culture 
and take pride in the identity. 
for discussion between new Maori protest groups and 
elders of new ideas than can be put through the "kill or 
cure· test of the truly democratic processes of Maori 
society. 
and to help breach the social separation of the Pakeha 
and integrate him into Maori society. 24 
This desire for a separate cultural identity saw the emergence in urban 
areas of young Maoris re-asserting issues of cultural concern and authority. 
In 1970 Nga T omatoa was formed in Auckland as a Maori action group to 
press for the preservation of Maoritanga particularly in urban areas and the 
19 New Zealand Official Yearbook 1974 p.65 
20 The Dominion, March 20 1970 p.20, col 1-2 
21 Ibid 
22 G. Dunstan, p. 424 
23 R. Walker, 'Te Marae -Traditional Form with Modern Relevance". Te Maori Oct-
Nov 1971 p.41-47 
24 Ibid 
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elimination of racial discrimination.25 Nga Tamatoa translates to either 'the 
brave sons' or the 'young warriors' representing 'action, courage and 
continuity with the ancestors'. Led by university and teachers college 
students, it adopted conventional Pakeha demonstration techniques to 
) champion its cause. With strong personalities and the gift of trenchant 
expression the young Maori leaders exploited the news media and 
television, heckled government spokesmen, marched on parliament and 
distributed pamphlets as it successfully communicated to the Establishment 
long standing Maori grievances, such as the loss of land, the declining use 
of Maori language, the racist bureaucratic structures of Education and 
Justice and later organised protests at Waitangi Day. Nga Tamatoa was 
the largest young Maori cultural group (the other notables being Te Reo 
Maori and Te Roopu o te Matakite) and succeeded in shedding political 
light on vital maori issues.26 Now, the Maori could be heard in a voice the 
Pakeha could understand. 
Racial discrimination in New Zealand generally existed in covert forms 
and was expressed in public areas of contact - in housing employment and 
certain types of commercial seNice One to one racism was not common -
or if it was, remained unheard. With the help of pressure groups, evidence 
of racial discrimination became big news. During the period researched 
two notable examples received widespread attention. The first concerned 
pronunciation of Maori place names on public radio. The New Zealand 
Broadcasting Corporation decided to reverse its policy of correct usage to 
the accepted common usage. So "Paraparaumu· for instance, becomes 
,, "Paraparam·. The decision received intense criticisms from Dr R.J. Walker of 
Auckland University who claimed it represents the most serious affront to the 
Maori people since the No Maori No Tour fiasco .27 In the second incident a 
Wellington estate manager refused to let a house to two Maori women on 
the grounds of their race. It received widespread criticism and made press 
stories in the main dailies.2a Race issues were clearly a topical issue and 
featured in correspondence columns under a general heading of 
'Racialism'. The public mostly remained sympathetic to this issue however 
25 J. Metge, The Maoris ofNew Zealand p.177-178 
26 Ibid p.177-178 and Dunstan p. 424-426 
27 Walker to Newnham 3 April1967 (CARE, Records, NZMS 845) 
28 The Dominion, Sept 18 1969. p~3 col1-3 
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occasionally angry letters, intolerant of racial concerns appeared. 29 
With over 50% of Maori people living in close proximity to Pakeha in 
urban areas combined with a strong urban cultural resurgence, the reQl 
Maori plight was laid at the doorstep of white New Zealand. It had an 
) educative effect removing ignorant mistruths dwelt on for so long and while 
most Pakeha remained inactive to Maori concerns, they could no longer 
ignore them. Some however, learnt from what they saw- developing a 
deeper understanding of racial issues and what they meant. Their voices 
were to get more numerous and louder. 
., 
c. 
The rugby relationship between New Zealand and South Africa had 
run into difficulties before 1970. These difficulties had their origin in the differing 
pattern of race relations in the two countries in so far as these affected 
selection of representative teams. In New Zealand where unlike South 
Africa, there is no segregation under custom or formal law national sporting 
teams to travel abroad were normally chosen on merit alone without 
regard to race. 
When touring South Africa however, this had not been the case. Due 
to the peculiar segregated way of life, South African invitations insisted New 
Zealand send white-only teams. The NZRFU respected this condition when 
selecting its teams. The compliance to South African wishes by the NZRFU 
had been increasingly disputed by concerned New Zealanders who 
questioned the discriminatory nature of these conditions to non-white races, 
in what should be a representative team chosen without race 
considerations. With Maoris identifying very quickly with rugby, All Black rugby 
,, tours of South Africa, by and large became the focus of the dispute. 
Before World War II New Zealand's contacts with South Africa went 
relatively unchallenged, and on each occasion only murmurings of 
disapproval were heard.30 In 1949 New Zealand was to tour South Africa. 
Many Pakeha, having witnessed or heard about the brave Maori battalion 
exploits in WWII, believed Maoris had earned their citizenship 31 and must 
take their rightful place beside the Pakeha in all aspects of life including 
29 1b.id Sept. 19 1969, p.8 col4 (letter) 
30 R. Thompson. Retreat From Apartheid p.14 




representation in national sporting teams, should their skills merit selection. 32 
Maori MP E T Tirikatene, and the trade unions both objected strongly to 
Maori exclusion and suggested the South African Rugby Board be informed 
it was not a representative team of New Zealand. 33 Tirikatene, in a 
parliament speech also put to the NZRFU; on whose initiative were Maoris 
excluded? Had the NZRFU of 'its own volition' or had South Africa specified 
Maori exclusion in the invitation? The NZRFU did not answer replying that 
'busy-bodies' were trying to bring 'extraneous' issues into what was 'purely a 
rugby matter'.34 This "no comment" response by the NZRFU on matters 
relating to South Africa became a familiar pattern in later debates. The 
controversy soon passed and the All Blacks received a state farewell at 
Parliament before leaving for the republic. 
The Springboks, white South Africa's national rugby team, toured New 
Zealand in 1956, playing a Maori team as part of their itinerary. Little was 
heard controversially as the Springboks had to abide by New Zealand's 
customs, which do not recognise Apartheid. 
In 1958 the All Blacks received an invitation to tour South Africa in 1960, 
again raising the issue of the NZRFU selection policy. In June the next year 
the NZRFU announced that Maori players would be excluded from the All 
Black team. As in the past, the Union expected a small protest and were 
confident it would peter our quickly. 35 This was not so. The churches, 
considered the ·vanguard of protest" 36 had already issued a joint 
statement in disapproval of Maori exclusion. It said in part; 
that in selecting a team that is to represent New Zealand, no 
player should be excluded on the grounds of race.37 
The churches spoke up early and strongly bringing peoples attention 
to the problem. The NZRFU felt compelled to justify their stance. In reaching 
the decision the union was concerned 'with the best interests of its Maori 
players'. The NZRFU claimed to include Maoris may expose them to the 
32 Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.15-16 
33 lhld 
34 Ibid p.16-17 
35 Thid, p. 19 






intolerable indignities of South African Apartheid.38 To reinforce their position 
the Maori Advisory Board of the NZRFU unanimously reaffirmed its support for 
the exclusion of Maori players from the tour.39 The public remained 
unconvinced and soon the Trade Unions, University Students Associations 
and members of the Maori community swung in behind the churches. 40 
Of greater significance was the formation in June 1959 of Citizens All 
Black Tour Association (CABTA) whose aims were 'To combat racial 
discrimination in the selection of the 1960 rugby team to tour South Africa, and 
to demand the abandonment of the tour if absolute equality of treatment 
cannot be assured'.ln short, if Maoris were not eligible for selection then the 
tour should not proceed. As New Zealand's first organised sporting pressure 
group CABTA saw themselves as a focal point from which the protest would 
gain strength.41 This it did. CABTA, deliberately non political and non 
sectarian, spread throughout the country rallying support from all sectors. 
Along with the groups already mentioned; public seNants, staff of universities, 
teachers colleges, and a number of civic and professional bodies all 
supported the CABTA objective. 42 The focus of protest, for the main part 
was, the NZRFU with a reluctance by CABTA to target the political field.43 Yet 
by the end of 1959 the movement had made little headway due mainlyto 
the NZRFU's obstinate 'no comment' stance. The Rugby Union refused to 
discuss the implications of its decision.44 CABTA then turned to political party 
leaders and presented a petition with 153,000 signatures calling for non-racial 
selection while pleading for moral support and demanding no State 
farewell be given to an all-white team. 45 With elections looming nine 
months away neither the Prime Minister nor Leader of the Opposition were 
prepared to commit themselves. Despite a heated debate both showed 
an overt reluctance for involvement claiming the issue was not the concern 
38 Ibid, p.24 
39 Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.21 
40 Redpath, pp 45-50 
41 1hld 
42 Thompson,. Retreat From Apartheid p.22 
43 Redpath, p.60 
44 Thid, p.67-69 
45 Thompson, Race and Sport p.45 
) 
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of parliament and reiterated their official helplessness.46 
This failure to gain the vital support needed, saw protest moral drop-
the tour looked unstoppable. 
The Sharpeville Massacre and the declaration of a state of 
emergency in South Africa altered the situation overnight.47 The Trade 
Unions called for cancellation and the Prime Minister, Walter Nash 
redeclared Government opposition to racial discrimination and confirmed 
the onus of cancellation was upon the Rugby Union. After two weeks the 
NZRFU announced that failing further disturbances the tour would continue as 
planned. The all-white All Blacks were given a state farewell and left for 
South Africa. 48 
The protest movement was noted for its sincerity and the dignified 
-) way it was conducted. Rugby matches were the venues for the non-
disruptive, formal demonstrations. The only unorderly protest of the 
controversy occurred when two people evaded police and rushed onto 
the tarmac to stop the All Black plane leaving.49 
y 
The issues involved in 1960 were simple and understood by opposing 
sides. The controversy was wholly domestic, concentrating on the moral 
issue of racial discrimination practised within New Zealand. Racial guidelines 
were unacceptable in selection procedures of a national representative 
side and complying to South Africa's Apartheid wishes would no longer be 
tolerated. CABTA and supporting organisations campaigned for this. The 
Government absolved itself by passing the buck to the NZRFU who 
maintained compliance justifying it on paternal protectionist grounds. 
The 1960 protest had two lasting effects. Firstly, within rugby, 1960 could 
be seen as the watershed year of rugby's politicisation.so Public opinion 
was extremely strong in support of Maori inclusion, something the NZRFU 
could not ignore. Cuthbert Hogg, Chairman of the NZRFU Council made it 
clear the NZRFU was not prepared to go through the ·same performance·, 
and future All Black teams will include Maoris or otherwise a European only 
46 Ibid 
47 Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.23 
48 Thompson R. Race and Sport p. 47-48 
49 Redpath, p.62-64 and p.83 




team with less than the All Black status would be the only compromise. 51 The 
possible consequences of this public pressure is borne out later. Secondly, 
it seNed to bring New Zealand's race relations problems into the open. The 
exclusion of Maoris from the All Blacks led discussion into other areas of racial 
discrimination against Maoris, revealing uncomfortable truths. It caused 
many to reconsider New Zealand as a model of race relations. 52 
In 1961-62 the New Zealand Cricket team toured South Africa. An all-
white team was chosen due to a) South African requirements and b) a total 
lack of first class Maori cricketers from which to choose. Due largely to the 
later reasoning the issue failed to arouse New Zealand public interest. The 
small protest did not raise the question of excluded Maoris, but on the 
exclusion of non-white South African players from their national side which 
New Zealand was to play. 53 
Then in 1964 New Zealand hosted the reciprocal tour of the all-white 
South African team. Considerable pressure was placed on the New 
Zealand Cricket Council by South African protest groups who impressed on 
the Council the exclusively white selection standards of the touring team. 
This inspired a New Zealand protest which again was restrained and orderly. 
The lack of interest was attributable to the vital issue being concerned with 
South African discrimination which New Zealanders knew little about,· the 
short duration of the tour, and bad weather which cancelled some 
matches and reduced the impact the tour had on New Zealand.54 
The next major contact with South African sports teams was the 1965 
Springbok rugby tour of New Zealand. While opposition to the visit was 
substantial the overwhelming reaction was ready acceptance. The all-
white Springbok team, aware of the political overtones endeavoured to 
establish a favourable rapport with their New Zealand hosts. They 
accomplished this mission easily. The tour held massive interest nationwide 
and the Springboks were wined and dined throughout their stay with a total 
of 700,000 spectators paying to see them play. 55 The protest movement, 
although active, was overshadowed by enthusiastic support for the tour. 
51 Redpath, p.86 
52 Ibid 
53 Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.27 
54 Ibid p.30 
55 Ibid pp.31-38 
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1967 and the proposed rugby tour of South Africa by New Zealand 
brought the 'No Maori No Tour' issue back into the headlines. Speculation 
concerning Maori acceptability began early, as New Zealand journalists 
sought confirmation from South African rugby boss Dr Donie Craven the 
terms of the invitation. On the one hand Dr Craven implied the team may 
include Maoris yet on the other South African Prime Minister, Dr Verwoerd 
implied they could not. 56 The ambiguity was cleared when Senator De 
Klerk, Minister of the Interior issued the following statement. 
The Cabinet had decided earlier, and now again unanimously, 
against the reception of mixed teams. Recently I also 
discussed this matter frankly with Dr Craven and others and 
informed Dr Craven unequivocally that Maoris would not be 
acceptable as members of a touring team .... 57 
This announcement struck New Zealand's moral nerve. Newspaper 
editorials up and down the country called for an unqualified No Maori No 
Tour stand. Community groups also felt compelled to issue statements in 
opposition. The Rugby Union however looked to continue rugby 
exchanges between the two countries.58 Mr Pearce, President of the 
NZRFU claimed; 
We have a duty to the Maoris but we also have a duty to the 
game of Rugby. Their will be a good deal of agitation, but we 
must do what is best in the interest of Rugby. 59 
If Maoris were refused inclusion they would understand the reason for this 
'because they are a most understanding people'. 60 Soon after Prime 
Minister Holyoake delivered an important policy speech. It stated New 
Zealand considered the principles of full racial equality as a basic tenet of 
-, 'New Zealand's way of life' and this principle could not be outweighed by 
'special considerations which have domestic application elsewhere'. 
Holyoake had in effect given the Government thumbs down to the NZRFU. 
In addition the protest machine started up again and the F.O.L. 
threatened a boycott to any team racially selected. Following this the 
NZRFU stated it was 'unable to accept in its present form' South Africa's 







invitation. The tour was cancelled. 61 What exactly prompted the Rugby 
Union to cancel remains difficult to know. Was it public pressure? Was it 
government disapprovaL or was it the NZRFU refusing to act on South Africa's 
orders? Possibly one, but more likely to be a combination of these. 
Up till this time the central controversial issue remained constant. Only 
the threat of official domestic, racial discrimination would mobilise the 
greater public to protest. New Zealand would no longer acquiesce to the 
racial policies of another country in choosing a national team. The 





THE ISOLATION OF SOUTH AFRICA: 
THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL OPPOSITION TO APARTHEID SPORT 
By 1970 opposition to white South Africa's sporting policies had become a 
prominent topical issue in world affairs. Consequently to examine New 
Zealand's approach to the controversy a brief examination of the rise of the 
wider opposition is necessary. How extensive was it? What forms did it take, 
was it successful? 
The development of Apartheid in sport was consistent with the 
development of South African society in general. Before the second world 
war and the emplacement of rigid Apartheid laws, South African racial 
, discrimination was ruled more by customs and tradition. And while no formal 
,, law was directed specifically towards preventing black and white 
sportsmen at this time from playing sport against each other, organised 
sport was generally subject to the same racial segregation as other social 
activities and most clubs had racially exclusive membership rules.l 2 
-l 
Occasionally racial barriers would break down. There is evidence to 
suggest mixed sport did occur but was restricted to less formal occasions 
like factory lunch-hours and not on an organised basis.3 A further pattern also 
developed, where whites had facilities, money, schooling and opportunity, 
the non-white community had few facilities, little money, inadequate 
schooling and virtually no opportunity. 
Money, the basis behind any sporting enterprise was, for non-white 
communities, very difficult to obtain. The rare sporting facilities which did exist 
in the townships were generally financed by the sale of beer and spirits. 
Huge profits from the sale of alcohol were almost the only funds which the 
municipalities running the townships made available for social and housing 
development. Residents strongly disapproved of this system claiming it was 
morally and socially unacceptable to finance their tennis courts with profits 
1 Due to limitations of time I have been m1able to conduct the necessary primary research 
into the vast field of international opposition to apartheid sport. Thus there is 
substantial need to rely on secondary sources for information. 
2 R. Archer, and A Boullon, South African Game : Sport and Racism p.40 
3 P. Hain, Don't Play with Apartheid p.49 
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denied from the alcoholism of the mass of African workers.4 This situation was 
exacerbated when the government removed all restrictions on the sale of 
alcoholic drinks to Blacks in 1961 and 1962. 
Facilities were most often an improvisation of local resources. Non-
,\ whites would 'take over' open spaces outside towns and make them 
usable. With time, some local councils made available areas for non-white 
sport even contributing small grants for basic facilities. For non-whites though 
there was no point in constructing large and permanent structures because 
a) permission to build was denied and b) a condition of tenure stated 
permanent possession was disallowed so, as was often the case, when 
they lost the ground they lost whatever facilities were erected upon it.s 
Schools, provided by far the greatest sporting opportunities for Black 
children. Yet only 18.1% of children the school age attended classes in 1936, 
and rose moderately to 27.1% ten years later. The vast majority of those in 
attendance completed a four year primary education before dropping 
out. Beyond school, sporting opportunities were non-existent, for non-whites, 
and those who were lucky or particularly gifted athletes took their skills 
abroad. 6 
Being a Commonwealth country South Africa has traditional ties with 
other member countries and has, through these contacts adopted similar 
sporting pursuits. 
Socially games like tennis, cricket, rugby, bowls, golf, surfing, motor-
racing, yachting, hunting, fishing, climbing and shooting were all popular 
pastimes. In the realm of competitive sport rugby, cricket, tennis and 
,. athletics remained very prominent and attracted the largest crowds. Due 
to the nature of these chosen sports, when South Africa competed 
internationally it was very often with her Commonwealth members.? 
After the war and the election to office of the National Party in 1948 the 
tradition of segregated sport hardened under the Apartheid laws. Though 
no specific law prevented mixed sport a number of other general and 
specific laws were passed which effectively rendered the playing of 
multiracial sport illegal. The imposition of Apartheid reduced the rights and 
4 R. Archer, p. 40 
5 Rain, p.50 
6 Archer, p.40 
7 Ibid, p.38 
.\ 
18 
opportunities of black people in all domains and therefore in sport as well. a 
All mixed sport came to an end, and bodies which had mixed 
membership before the war required immediate alteration.9 
Segregation in sport under law saw non-whites set up new bodies with 
non-racial constitutions. They became stronger and formed into multi-racial 
national organisations with large memberships.l o There were however 
significant difficulties which faced these new sporting bodies. 
They demanded to be recognised on terms of equality with other 
white sportsmen and questioned the affiliation of the white bodies to 
international associations. This was not easy. White sporting affiliations 
already had long standing links with their respective international bodies 
some even being the founding member. White organisations were 
established as the South African delegates and international constitutions 
excluded the possibility of recognising more than one affiliate from each 
country. 11 The attempt to dislodge white representatives in favour of non-
white bodies met opposition from white South Africa and apathy from 
international bodies who were reluctant to listen to non-white requests. For 
the moment, non-white bodies looked to secure international sports 
recognition with or over their white counterparts. The first organised attempt 
to do this was the formation in 1955 of the Committee for International 
Recognition. This group failed according to Brutus "largely because of 
timidity. People feared to reply" But its very formation and function was 
crucial to the subsequent formation of sports protest groups later.l2 Success 
for the non-white cause came in 1956 when the International Table Tennis 
" Federation expelled the racially exclusive white body and gave affiliation 
,; 
to an organisation representing non-whites but pledged to non-racism.l3 
This exclusion of a white South African team drew angry responses 




withhold support from any non-white sports body which sought 




11 Archer, p.187 
12 R. Lapchick, The Politics of Race and International Sport, p.40 
13 Hain, p.52 
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whites guilty of such subversive intentions.14 
White South African sporting bodies were determined to fight any challenge 
to their exclusive rights to send teams abroad and receive visiting sides. 
1958 saw the formation of the South African Sports Association (SASA) 
-~ which brought together many larger non-white sports bodies under one 
unified organisation, it's aims were to; 
Co-ordinate non-white sport, to advance the course of sport 
and the standard of sport among non-white sportsmen, to see 
that they and their organisations secure proper recognition (in 
South Africa) and abroad, and to do this on a non-racial 
basis.lS 
SASA represented over 70,000 black sportsmen and women from athletics, 
cycling, cricket, football, weightlifting, tennis, table tennis, softball, netball and 
:\ baseball. 16 Now under the guild of one unified movement non-white 
sporting interests could focus upon achieving recognition and removing 
racism in sport with greater proficiency. At this stage SASA and non-white 
sports interests pressured for international participation for black sportsmen 
and women within the framework of segregation in national sport.17 Along 
with some minor international successes SASA looked to consolidate non-
white sport organisation in South Africa. 
In fulfilling its aims SASA appealed consistently to white South African 
sports bodies to reject race discrimination and to include non-white players 
in representative teams. It has appealed to white South African sports 
bodies to eliminate all racial exclusiveness and to form genuinely national 
and non-racial organisations. It has appealed to the international bodies 
governing each sport to insist that their South African affiliates be fully 
representative, and even to the people of countries with which exclusively 
white South Africa has reciprocal tour arrangements, not to condone race 
discrimination.la 
" For four years appeals to the South African Olympic and National 
Games Association (SAONGA) to end its racial restrictions were ignored or 
evaded. 
14 
15 Speech of Alan Paton at Opening ceremony of the SASA, 10 January 1959 cited by 
Archer p.191 
16 Archer, p.191 
17 Ibid, p.141 
18 Thompson, Race and Sport. p.18 
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With each appeal developed a familiar pattern of opposition. When 
a national non-racial body contacted the all-white organisation in a 
particular sport, it was referred to the all-white SAONGA which confirmed 
membership for their affiliates was for white amateur sportsmen only. When 
the international body in a sport was contacted they referred the matter to 
',>. the International Olympic Committee (IOC) which in turn referred it back to 






In 1962 at the SASA October conference a sub-committee was set up 
called the South African Non Racial Olympic Committee (SAN-ROC) which 
had the specific target of working for non-racism in the Olympic field.2D Its 
chief aim was to seek from the IOC the right to represent South Africa and to 
bring about the expulsion of the South African Olympic and National Games 
Committee.21 Thus the creation of SAN-ROC marked the end of fruitless 
attempts to negotiate with white Associations and the opening of a full 
blooded campaign to destroy the racial structures in South African sport and 
to replace them by a system based on merit alone, in line with the Olympic 
principles. 22SAN-ROC openly called for an international boycott of South 
African sport, in the name of non-racial principles and declared itself ready 
to expose and fight racial discrimination wherever it exists in sport. 23 
Reaction from White South African authorities to the increasing 
pressures placed on their international sporting status came from white 
sporting bodies and Government alike. 
While the white committees championed their traditional sporting 
opponents for continued recognition, the Government took more drastic 
measures instructing the Special Branch of the South African Police to 
intimidate and harass SASA and SAN-ROC officials. In April, 1960 shortly after 
the Sharpeville shootings the government used the state of emergency 
laws as a pretext to raid the SASA offices and seize all its archives.24 
Secretary, Dennis Brutus, SASA's prime mover and inspirational figure was 
19 Hain, p. 54 
Ibid, p.56 
21 Thompson, Race and Sport p.l9 
22 Archer, p.193 
~ Hain, p.55 





singled out for additional attention receiving "banning orders· restricting him 
to the magisterial district of Johannesburg. 2s When SAN-ROC expressed 
their intentions to exclude South Africa from the Olympics, state pressure 
intensified. In July 1963 Brutus was arrested for breaking one of the banning 
orders. While on bail he escaped over the Swaziland border into 
Mozambique but was caught and returned to South African secret police 
by Portuguese police (in defiance of international law). To attract attention, 
for his friends, family and colleagues were not aware of his plight, Brutus 
leapt from the escorting police car but was shot from point blank range in 
the stomach and left to bleed on the street in rush hour traffic. When finally an 
ambulance arrived, it was discovered to be white and drove off leaving 
Brutus to wait till a coloured ambulance could be found to take him to 
hospital. Once released from hospital Brutus was sentenced to 18 months 
hard labour on Robben Island which he duly seNed. 26 
All SAN-ROC committee members were subjected to special agent 
intimidation. When leaving South Africa SAN-ROC officials either had their 
passports denied or seized. Banning orders were served on them, they 
were picked up for interrogation, and pressure was brought to bear on their 
employers. Brutus the president was banned, the SAN-ROC secretary was 
banned, Christ de Broglie who was active behind the scenes had to leave 
after police pressured his employers. 27 
Due to Government instructed pressures SAN-ROC's leading players 
had either been deported or were under heavy restrictions bringing to a 
halt SAN-ROC activity within South Africa. 
All was not lost for SAN-ROC and the non-white sporting campaign. In 
June, 1962 the IOC warned the SAONGA that its membership would be 
suspended unless an assurance could be given that any non-white 
sportsmen or women who reached the required standard to represent his 
country would be permitted to do so. the warning turned ultimatum at the 
IOC's October meeting at Baden-Baden in 1963 when a resolution was 
passed declaring that SAONGA would be forced to withdraw from the 
games unless it a) makes a firm declaration of its acceptance of the 
Olympic code (forbidding discrimination on the grounds of race) and b) 
25 Ibid, p.55. 
~ Archer, p.193 









obtains from the South African Government a change in policy regarding 
colour discrimination in sport.2a Early in 1964 at the lnnsbruck meeting of the 
IOC South Africa's invitation to the Tokyo games was withdrawn when she 
failed to comply with these two criteria. It was a significant victory for SAN-
ROC who had badgered the IOC to reach a verdict on South Africa's 
peculiar sporting policies. The decision by the IOC however, surprised SAN-
ROC members who had previously found the IOC unco-operative. SAN-
ROC believed the decision was prompted by a combination of shock at 
the shooting of Dennis Brutus and the worry by the IOC establishment of the 
growing strength of the African countries.29 Over the period 1964 to 1965 the 
international campaign slowed almost to a stop with SAN-ROC dislocated 
by members guarded, expelled or jailed. However, on his release Brutus 
joined de Broglie in London and re-established the organisation in exile 
launching a more determined effort to exclude South Africa from the 
Olympic Movement.30 
A decisive development in achieving this aim was the formation of 
the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa (SCSA). Thirty two African nations and 
delegates from SAN-ROC met, at Bamako in December 1966 and agreed 
upon SCSA's main resolution .. 
.. to obtain the expulsion of South African sports organisations 
from the Olympic Movement and from International 
Federations should South Africa fail to comply fully with the IOC 
rules.31 
The African nations also agreed not to participate in the 1968 Mexico 
Olympic Games if a 'racialist team from South Africa takes part'.32 It was a 
powerful show of strength from the African nations who were unified in their 
opposition. The commitment and influence of SCSA was not initially 
appreciated by South Africa and the IOC, yet was instrumental to South 
Africa's final expulsion from the Olympics. 
South Africa meanwhile, realised changes were needed to gain re-
admittance at the next Olympic meeting. Over the next two years the South 
African National Olympic Committee (which is the South African Olympic and 
28 Muriel Horrel. South Africa and the Olympic Games. p.12-14 
Hain, p.58 
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National Games Committee under a new name) used all its political skill, on 
the one hand to placate world opinion by deceptively creating seemingly 
genuine mechanisms to bring its selection policy into line with the IOC 
charter, while on the other, but with the same mechanisms, circumventing 
the non-racial requirement. At the 1966 Rome Conference South Africa 
proposed a multiracial committee which consisted of three non-whites, 
three whites and presided over by the President of SANOC to choose the 
South African teams for the 1968 meeting. The IOC agreed, effectively 
surrendering the control of fair selection of South African teams to SANOC 
because the presiding president Frank Brown had the casting vote thus 
loading the count 4:3 against the non-whites.33 Such a multi-racial 
committee gave the appearance of fair and equal selection procedures, 
while also portraying a conscious attempt at improving the segregated 
system in sport. 
In addition to this committee, the IOC ordered a three-man 
commission to investigate the situation in South Africa and report back at the 
next IOC meeting. Between Rome and the next meeting in Teheran, Prime 
Minister of South Africa, Vorster, made an important policy speech. He said 
inte alia; 
That policy for internal sports relations between the races had to 
be separated from the countries sports relations with other 
countries: in domestic sport, each race must continue to 
practise and administer its sport separately; and, just as it was 
good for Nigerians, Ethiopians and other non-white states to 
participate in the Olympics, South Africa would allow its non-
whites to participate, but this had to be within the framework of 
Apartheid in domestic sport.34 
With this announcement Vorster created a dual stand on South African 
sport. And in a latter speech he unequivocally declared that Apartheid 
would continue to be strictly applied within South African sport. 35 
The Teheran Conference in April, 1967 failed to decide South Africa's 
fate for the 1968 Olympics despite Braun's special plea for readmittance. 
He told the conference that after "protracted negotiations with the 
Government" South Africa was able to meet "the basic requirements of the 
IOC as they effect our participation in the Olympic games". He then listed 
33 Horrell, p.l7 






five concessions regarding the composition, travelling arrangements, 
representation, competition and selection of the South African team as 
evidence of rightful changes in South African sport.36 
While no decision was reached, the IOC announced that its three 
man commission which had not yet visited the Republic would do so and 
report back to the Grenoble session in January 1968.37 The commission 
returned from its nine day fact finding mission and reported that while sport in 
South Africa was racially separated and non-whites had inadequate 
sporting facilities, white sports officials were doing their best to select a fully 
representative team. 38 
In light of the concessions proclaimed by Braun and the findings of the 
commission the IOC moved to settle the matter by conducting a postal 
vote among all its seventy members. This resulted in a 38 to 27 vote in favour 
of re-inclusion. South Africa would be allowed to enter a team at the 
Mexico Olympics on the understanding that vigorous efforts would be 
continued, to remove all forms of racial discrimination in amateur sport. 39 
International reaction to South Africa's inclusion was swift. Within two days, ten 
countries announced they would not take part in the Olympics. The SCSA 
immediately convened in Brazzaville to discuss the situation. Thereafter one 
African nation after the other announced their boycott from Mexico. Iraq, 
Malaysia, Syria, Saudi, Arabia, India, and Kuwait supported the protest as 
did Italy and later the Soviet Union. By mid April over 50 countries had 
expressed their opposition to South Africa's readmission. In contrast Britain 
openly supported the IOC's decision while America fell conspicuously silent. 
America's black sports community though threatened to join the boycott. 
With the Mexico Olympics disintegrating the Executive Board of the IOC met 





In view of all the information on the international climate 
received by the Executive Board at this meeting, it is 
unanimously of the opinion that it would be most unwise for a 
South African team to participate in the games of the XIX 
Olympiad. Therefore the executive Board strongly 
recommends that you endorse this unanimous proposal to 
Ibid, p.63-65 
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withdraw the invitation to these games. 40 
Publicly, Avery Bundage the IOC's president told the press "we thought the 
safety of the South African team and the success of the Games were in 
grave doubt". Yet behind closed doors it was believed South Africa's 
presence at the games would have been attended by demonstrations 
and perhaps violence. On the 26th April, 1968 the IOC announced the vote 
for withdrawing South Africa's invitation to the games had been 46 against 14 
for with 2 abstentions.41 42 South Africa was out of the Mexico Olympics. 
South Africa was outraged at the decision. The Johannesburg Sunday 
Express maintained that.. 
politics, not the Olympic Ideal, mob law not the Olympic 
Movements legal procedures had won the pre-Olympic test... 
It has been shown that validly taken decisions ... can be 
reversed because of the vile threats of a venomous and 
vociferous pressure group.43 
Vorster equally outraged then proposed to organise a 'mini-Oiympics' as 
compensation for white South Africa's expulsion. Evolving into a whites only 
event, it quickly became a sham, with most invited countries pulling out, 
causing great embarrassment within South Africa. By 1970 at the IOC 
conference in Amsterdam world opposition had escalated against South 
Africa beyond further equivocation. On the 15th May 1970 South Africa was 
· expelled from the Olympic Movement. 44 
Since 1896, the Olympic Games have been held every four years 
inviting nearly every country to compete together in what is frequently 
lauded the greatest sporting occasion in the world. South Africa became 
the first country in the history of the Olympic Movement to be expelled. 
Consequently, the ramifications of expulsion were far-reaching. Because 
the Olympics touch all nations in numerous sports the influence the IOC has 
on sporting policy is greater than any other sport organisation. The rulings of 
~~ the IOC set persuasive precedents to other sporting code affiliations and 
while not all organisations feel the need to follow IOC rulings in regard to 
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Olympic eligibility to 1968 they had been excluded from many international 
federations and competitions- table tennis, football, basketball, volleyball, 
swimming, fishing, sea fishing, fencing cycling and amateur boxing. In 1969 
South Africa was expelled or suspended from netball, cross country, 
presentation gymnastics, judo and weightlifting, and early in 1970 from 
international tennis. With the IOC reviewing South African Olympic status it 
prompted other sporting affiliations to assess for themselves South Africa's 
involvement within their own pursuits. Further, the swing of opinion against 
South Africa combined with numerous exclusions meant those sporting 
affiliations which neglected to decide or voted favourably for South Africa's 
inclusion and continued contact appeared to travel against the tide of 
public opinion making themselves targets for increasingly stronger protest 
movements. 
For SAN-ROC and the protest movement the Olympic expulsion was 
the culmination of eight years constant campaigning. While assessing how 
much SAN-ROC influenced the IOC decision will remain impossible, what is 
certain is SAN-ROC never let the IOC forget the South African issues. The 
apparent success of their efforts served to spur other anti-Apartheid protest 
groups elsewhere. In the last years before the Amsterdam decision the 
current of anti-South African sentiment became considerably stronger, 
making 1970 for South African sport a disaster. An examination of the major 
events is required to understand more fully South Africa's predicament by 
1970. 
Aside from the Olympics white South Africa's two most favourite sports 
are the Commonwealth pastimes of rugby union and cricket. 
Rugby in South Africa .. 
is one of the three cultural activities of the white population, the 
other two being lying in the sun and eating. 45 
It is the national sport, South Africans are devoted to it and the game and 
players hold the grandiose qualities of myth. As with New Zealand rugby, 
white South African rugby has been accorded religious status. Introduced to 
South Africa in 1862 by Canon George Ogilvie it had immediate widespread 
appeal, with the Afrikaner population identifying particularly so. The 
Springboks are the highest expression next to the Dutch reformed Church 
45 Archer, p. 79 
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and the Nationalist Party, of the Africaaner spirit.46 South Africa was one of the 
original International Rugby Board (IRB) member countries and during the 
first half of this century reigned undefeated rugby champions over all other 
affiliate members. Non whites adopted rugby concurrently with the white 
populous however due to the segregated traditions and general 
ignorance to the existence of non-white rugby in and outside South Africa, it 
has been refused recognition by the white South African Rugby Board 
(SARB) and hence holds no place internationally.47 
Cricket, likewise shares center stage with rugby in South African sport. 
Until the 1950's cricket was considered an English game. Afrikaners were 
reluctant to play a game so closely aligned with British imperialism and only 
when South Africa departed from the Commonwealth could the Afrikaner 
play with ·a quiet conscience". Between 1955 and 1970 the number of white 
cricketers more than doubled. The successes of the national side helped 
promote cricket in South Africa till it also acquired national game status.48 
During the 1960's South Africa looked to protect these sports from the 
imposing boycotts however the events from 1968 to 1970 saw these stronger 
sporting bonds begin to disintegrate. Creating a situation of near complete 
sporting isolation for the apartheid Republic. 
As previously outlined the first decisive blow against the sanctity of 
these treasured sporting contacts come when statements from Prime 
Minister Dr Verwoerd relinquished any possibility of Maori travelling with the All 
Blacks to South Africa in 1967. The NZRFU under pressure from the public and 
Government finally called off the tour. The following year South Africa 
received a further more damaging blow to Apartheid sport. It came with 
:r the Basil D'Oiiveira affair. 
D'Oiiveira was a coloured South African born in the Cape who from a 
young age developed into a top class cricketer. Restricted by cricket's 
segregationist practises D'Oiiveira travelled to England to further his career. 
After several seasons he joined Worcestershire County Cricket Club and 
soon established himself as one of Englands promising all-rounders. Having 
successfully performed for England against the West Indies in 1966 D'Oiiveira 
46 Chris Laidlaw "Mud in Your Eye" p. 187 
47 Archer, p.60 




was expected to make the touring side for South Africa in 1968-69.49 
Reaction from South Africa was instant. The then Minister of the Interior 
LeRoux said in January 1967. 
Our policy is clear. We will not allow mixed teams to play 
against our white teams here. If this player (D'Oiiveira) were 
chosen he would not be allowed to come here. That is our 
policy. It is well known here and overseas.so 
The MCC ( the ruling body for cricket in England) tried to defer the issue till the 
time of selection while South African Minister of Sport, Frank Waring 
hammered home South Africa's policy . 
.. .. . The government has on many occasions made it quite clear 
that it opposes mixed sport in South Africa.sl 
The MCC then replied to this uncompromising stand by stating its team 
would be chosen solely on merit and if D'Oiiveira maintained good form it is 
likely he would be selected. If South Africa would not accept a team with 
D'Oiiveira as a member, the tour would be cancelled. Battle lines had 
been drawn. If South Africa refused D'Oiiveira, the tour would be cancelled. 
There was concern in South Africa that, should the MCC cancel, New 
Zealand and Australian tour policy would follow. suit. This resulted in 
contradictory statements as to South Africa's true position regarding 
D'Oiiveira. LeRoux denied that he had said D'Oiiveira could not go, Vorster 
sounded undecided one minute then confirmed his position the next and 
leading Dailies predicted an easing of Apartheid doctrines in sport. 
To confuse matters further, D'Oiiveira's cricketing fortunes took a turn for 
the worse. His form slumped through the 1968 season and he was 
dropped from England to play the home series against Australia in 1969. A 
late season return to form saw D'Oiiveira re-selected for the final test against 
Australia. He scored 158 which put him back in contention for the South 
African tour. 
On Wednesday 28th August the England team was announced. 
D'Oiiveira was left out. The English cricketing fraternity was stunned. The 
distinguished cricket journalist John Arlott, wrote in the Guardian 'no one of. 
open mind will believe he was left out for valid cricketing reasons.' On 
September 16 an injury to all rounder Tom Cartwright forced him to retire and 
49 Rain, p.78 




D'Oiiveira was selected to take his place. A situation that the MCC and 
South Africa had hoped would never eventuate was upon them. Vorster 
was outraged and the following day stated he was not prepared to 
accept an MCC team forced upon South Africa by people with certain 
political motives'. 
"It's not" he said, "The MCC team it's the team of the anti 
apartheid movement...lt is a team of political opponents of 
South Africa ... who don't care about sports relations at all". 
The MCC also remained unmoved declaring if the team is unacceptable 
the tour was off. On the 24th September after a final breakdown in talks the 
MCC announced the cancellation of the tour. 
The manifestations of this result on world opinion were far-reaching. 
South Africa before all the world had exposed its racial qualifications for 
visiting teams and shown its absolute inflexible insistence of this. It provided 
an atmosphere of public awareness to Apartheid and sport issues and 
more importantly provided the initial impetus to England's first pressure group 
whose solitary aim was to stop tours with South Africa. On September 10, 1969 
Peter Hain and Hugh Geach supported by Dennis Brutus formally 
announced the formation of the 'Stop the Seventy Tour Committee (STST) at 
the press conference held in a Fleet Street Pub, Hain who was initially 
responsible for handling press inquiries told reporters STST was formed to 
mount a sustained campaign against Apartheid in sport and were working 
for the cancellation of the 1970 tour of Britain by a white South African cricket 
team. Their tactics and commitment were aptly spelled out by Louis Eaks, 
Chairman of the Young Liberals when he said. 
The era of petitions and reasoned debate has been rejected 
by those responsible for sport ... our action is a response to this 
morally indefensible policy of Apartheid in sport ... is there any 
justification for importing Apartheid into this country? ... we are not 
committed to a programme of non-violent civil disobedience 
to disrupt the 1970 South African tour. I believe many people 
are prepared to risk arrest and even imprisonment on this 
crucial issue of principle. We have asked the MCC on 
numerous occasions to take a reasoned stand against 
Apartheid in sport. It is they who will be responsible if Lords 
becomes the Ulster of the sporting world next summer.s2 
STST was advocating direct action because, Hain explains, 'other methods 
52 Ibid, p.156 and Hain, P.122 
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have failed' 53 Their announcement, intentions and tactics aroused a great 
deal of interest. Few could have predicted what was to happen over the 
next nine to ten months. Hain ... 
... we had no idea of what to expect: only a determination to 
succeed. If we had fully thought out the magnitude of the task 
ahead of us, perhaps we would never have started. If we had 
foreseen the mass movement that sprang and which led to a 
major domestic and international political upheaval, perhaps 
we would have been daunted. If I had seen my sudden thrust 
into the position of 'leading' this movement and the 
consequent complete upheaval of my personal life and that 
of the other members of our family, perhaps I would quietly 
have forgotten about the whole business.54 
The D'Oiiveira affair had aroused concern over Apartheid in cricket and STST 
pledged a commitment to stop the South African cricket tour, but to remain 
consistent in their appraisals STST had to deal with the Springbok rugby tour 
first. 
The South African Springboks embarked on a twenty-five match tour 
of Great Britain and Ireland which will be remembered not for the rugby 
played but for the demonstrations, marches and violence that occurred at 
every match. In all 50,000 demonstrators turned out 9,000 police were 
appointed to contain them and the official figure for police costs rose over 
£50,000. 400 arrests were made with a similar number detained. One match 
was abandoned and two were switched from their original venues. There 
was a fantastic drop in attendances and subsequently a drop in gate 
takings. 55 
The campaign began before the first match. A week before the 
Springboks were due to arrive protesters ruined the playing field at Oxford 
'r with weedkiller, spelling out "Oxford Rejects apartheid". This, along with a 
police recommendation, saw officials immediately call off the first match of 
the tour. For STST it proved very important. 
The calling off of the Oxford match was absolutely crucial to the 
7 fantastic growth in momentum of the campaign at this vital 
period just before the tourists were due to arrive.56 
The team was 'welcomed' by protesters at the airport who aimed to 'hound 
1 
53 Hain, p.l23 
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them' everywhere they went'.57 At practises, games, social functions, 
protesting was present. The teams bus was frequently followed or became 
the target of flour bombs and stones. Initially the Springboks were 
unperturbed, dismissing the protesters as "just a bunch of kids". Later 
however, their tune changed. Corrie Bornman the Springbok team 
manager said of the last three months, 'they have been an ordeal to which 
I would never again subject young sportsmen'. He went on ... 
I would be a fool to deny this awful undercurrent didn't affect 
the team and their performances. We came very close to 
breaking the tour off after the International against England.58 
Clearly, this sustained protest action had the unsettling effect desired. 
Although STST achieved most of its aims in demonstrating the costs for 
doing so were extraordinarily high. Demonstrations at games frequently 
became violent as protesters clashed with police and, worst of all, fanatic 
rugby supporters. 
STST looked to non-violent disruption of each game employing a 
:, variety of methods to do this. At Swansea, scene of the worst violence 
'l throughout the campaign, about 100 demonstrations invaded the pitch and 
sat down refusing to shift. The police which attended every match in plain 
clothes, tracksuits and uniforms then moved in to escort them off, helped by 
appointed rugby stewards who were more akin to rugby vigilantes than 
police helpers. Violence quickly ensued as police and stewards went to 
work on the protesters- men and women alike. Reports of protesters being 
dragged off the field and thrown amongst an angry crowd of rugby 
supporters to get beaten, or of women being dragged by their hair were 
) 
aplenty. STST immediately demanded a full public enquiry which was 
denied but the incident was sufficiently serious to warrant the Home 
Secretary to call a conference of Chief constables 'to discuss the best way 
in which police responsibilities can be carried out.' The rugby steward 
concept remained in tact for two more games before the Home Secretary 
barred them on the 25th November.S9 
When the South African's journeyed to Ireland the protest pressure 
was maintained. When the team arrived the trade unions blocked out the 
press at the airport and cut off telephone services at the hotel where the 
57 Hain, p.128 
58 Ibid, p.158 
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team stayed as demonstrators chanted in the street throughout the night60 
For the international match against Ireland at Lansdowne Road ten 
thousand demonstrators marched to the ground, which was surrounded in 
coiled barbed wire with hundreds of police stationed behind it. By 
comparison to demonstrations in England there were few violent clashes, 
but the Springbok camp was under a virtual state of siege due to the 
deliberate widening of the protest focus to include all Springbok activity on 
and off the field. 
The final match of the tour at Twickenham on 31 January was 
attended by 3,000 demonstrators outside and a further 500, who managed 
to get tickets, inside. Protesters inside threw dye and smoke bombs onto 
the field (invading the pitch was impossible because of barbed wire 
barriers and lines of police). Immediately fighting broke out on the terraces 
as plain clothed police and rugby fans took their own action to stop the 
disturbances. The police made 26 arrests and 46 protesters were ejected 
from the ground. In New Zealand The Dominion titled its report of this protest 
"the Battle of Twickenham".61 As the Springboks left Britain rugby reporters 
appeared unanimous in attributing some blame for the poor tour record, 
the worst by any South African side, to the effect of these demonstrations. 
A vital component of the greater protest structure over which 
campaigning groups have no control, is the media. Press coverage for the 
rugby campaign was, Hain describes, 'fantastic' 'one much better than that -
for most protest movements up till then' Some newspapers gave accurate 
coverage to the intrinsic issues involved as well as day to day accounts of 
protest action. Others focussed primarily on sensationalising demonstrator 
activities and still others openly opposed STST's motives and purpose. STST's 
only complaint concerned distorted coverage given to the effects of 
demonstrations. Hain summarised it thus: 
If the demonstration outside was big but peaceful it would get 
only a brief mention; but if it was rowdy and violent it would get 
banner headline coverage with an editorial inside 
condemning such protests.62 
New Zealand protest groups were to experience similar difficulties in media 
reporting. Quantative evidence for those supporting the STST cause at this 
oo Lapchick, p.166 
61 The Dominion Feb 2 1970 p.lO col 5-7 








time could not be found but, needless to say, the extent of protest at every 
match venue over the entire United Kingdom combined with large 
numbers actively protesting are testimony to growing support for STST's 
ultimate achievement to seek cancellation of the 1970 cricket tour by South 
Afiica. 
The rugby campaign was for STST the 'trial run' for their main objective 
and by establishing the arguments, displaying effective non-violent 
disruptive demonstrations and threatening tours to the point of cancellation 
they had set a perfect spring board from which to work for the stopping of 
the cricket tour due to begin in early May. STST was now an undisputed 
force. However an opinion poll conducted in early January registered 62% 
in favour of the MCC's decision, to proceed with the tour. 63 Soon after the 
two most important figures in British politics took opposite positions on the tour 
: Conservative Party leader Edward Heath stated his approval of the MCC's 
decision and Prime Minister Wilson questioned the wisdom of the tour 
adding that he would not attend any matches. Wilson claimed 
Once the South Africans have said that they were not taking a 
player we wanted to send, I would have rather thought that put 
them beyond the pale of civilised cricket.64 
While opposition to the rugby tour appeared to come from young people, 
protesting against the proposed cricket tour increasingly featured prominent 
members of the Establishment. 
On the day of the MCC mid-February meeting, STST delivered a 
13,000 name petition against the tour and demonstrated outside Lords 65 
during the meeting. Inside the MCC arrived at two significant decisions. 
Firstly that the tour had been reduced from eighteen weeks with twenty eight 
matches on twenty three grounds, to eleven weeks, with twelve matches on 
eight grounds and secondly that Lords was to be completely surrounded 
by barbed wire.66 The cricket council in reducing the number of matches 
was consolidating its resource to protect only eight grounds from 
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precautions 'This seems to be the first round to us.'67 
On March 7, STST held its own meeting announcing a fourfold strategy 
for the proposed tour, the most important of which aimed "to get the tour 
cancelled before it began· rather than after it started, as some wanted". In 
addition claims suggesting opposing factors were representative of only a 
small minority faced a direct challenge as a steady flow of community 
groups and individuals announced their support for STST movement. In mid-
March the West Indian campaign against Apartheid cricket was formed to 
champion STST support from West Indians living in Britain, John Arlott the most 
prestigious British cricket commentator announced he would not cover the 
tour, Prime Minister Wilson stated in a television interview he hoped people 
'would demonstrate against the South African cricket tour. Everyone should 
be free to demonstrate against apartheid'. 68 Then toward the end of April 
came five major announcements on the tour issue. 
On April 21 the British Council of Churches spoke for its six million parishes 
calling for peaceful demonstrations against the tour. The next day the 
Trades Union Congress joined in calling for a complete boycott. The 
Supreme Council for Sport in Africa then dropped its bombshell, stating if the 
tour proceeded its thirteen Commonwealth members would boycott the 
Edinburgh Commonwealth games in July. This would effectively leave the 
Edinburgh games an all-white affair destroying the spirit of the games and 
seriously threatening Commonwealth relations. 
The television companies, Granada and BBC publicly refused to 
broadcast the tour games as it felt 'it would be wrong to present these 
matches as entertainment'. And, on 26 April it was announced the Queen 
would not attend any matches nor invite the touring team to Buckingham 
Palace as was the tradition.69 
In the face of this official opposition the MCC stood fast. Dire 
predictions of mass violence from right-or left wing extremists were heard on 
hearing the MCC uncompromising stand. The Cricket Council though, 
could have sought compliance from official opinion polls. On May 3 the 
Opinion Research Center for the Sunday Times (London) found 55% of the 
British public were against Prime Minister Wilson's anti-tour staAd while only 
m Ibid 
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33% thought he was correct.7o 
In early May a new pressure group emerged, namely the Fair Cricket 
Campaign (FCC) who appealed to those masses in Britain who did not 
want to join direct action demonstrators and would 
by a massive peaceful demonstration outside Lords on 20 June 
demonstrate to the authorities and to the wider public the 
strong opposition that exists among people from all walks of life 
who normally do not involve themselves in the more 
conventional type of protest.71 
Peter Hain saw this second group in a positive light 
We don't see this as a split. It is putting into organised form a 
difference in tactics which has always existed between more 
moderate demonstrators and militants over direct action. It will 
bring out people who would not want to be associated with 
us.72 
FCC gave the protest movement a vital valve through which the vast 
reservoir of anti tour moderate opinion could be expressed. It broadened 
anti Apartheid support. 
A rising fear heard both publicly and in parliament, was the 
detrimental effects the tour would have on race relations. Home Secretary 
Callaghan said 'race relations in Britain would be so seriously damaged that 
the MCC should call off the tour immediately.73 Another equally widespread 
fear concerned the Commonwealth Games. By 15 May five more 
countries had withdrawn and it was feared the entire 'concept of the 
Commonwealth' could be wrecked if the tour proceeded.74 
Still the MCC would not budge. The Councils stand was faithfully 
supported by anti-demonstrator groups and the Conservative Party which 
actively campaigned for the tour. Despite their efforts public opinion had 
shifted dramatically, 58% of people supported cancellation increasing 25% 
in just over two weeks.75 In light of this, on May 19 the MCC astonishingly 
voted for the tour however Home Secretary Callaghan met with the MCC 
chairman and offered a face saving device in announcing the 
government was willing to take the blame and might defray some of the 
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costs of cancellation. The following day the MCC cancelled the tour. 
In a similar, but unrelated case was the Arthur Ashe affair. Ashe a black 
American tennis star applied to enter the South African open tennis 
championships but after speculation the South African Government denied 
him a visa of entry. Strangely enough in the same announcement the 
Government allowed Ashe to enter as part of the United States Davis Cup 
team. 76 
News of Ashe's denial hit headlines around the world. The United 
States, till now a silent voice in Apartheid controversies responded in saying 
the decision would damage "correct" United States - South African 
relations77 and George Hauser head of the American Committee on Africa 
(ACOA) called the decision 'a dramatic demonstration of the commitment 
of South Africa to a racist position.78 Alistair Marton, president of the United 
States Lawn Tennis Association (USLTA) called the decision 'a clear case of 
racial discrimination and the rules of the International Lawn Tennis Federation 
(ILTF) prohibit this'. 79 Ashe himself refused any comment. Previously he had 
voiced opposition to the South African Apartheid system, and was 
associated with the campaign against racialism both in America and 
internationally. 
In the face of furious world criticism, South African Minister of Sport, 
Waring, blamed Ashe's general 'antagonism toward South Africa' adding, 
his real motives in coming to South Africa were politicai.BO Publicly Ashe 
denied this allegation having signed notarized statements that he refused to 
discuss the political implications of the application and gave an undertaking 
that he would not make any statements on his reaction to South Africa until 








I was personally being denied an opportunity to play in a 
tournament that, rightly or wrongly, was part of the international 
circuit. I felt I should have the right to play in this tournament, or 









International Tennis Federation circuit.B2 
Ashe was criticised by some for ever having applied in the first place to take 
part in a tournament from which Blacks in South Africa were excluded. In 
retrospect Ashe maintains his intentions were justified as a black athlete and 
black person 
I knew I could not go to South Africa solely for athletic purposes. 
I had to go there, look around, absorb all I could about the 
place and publicize my feelings.B3 
The Ashe Affair had introduced the issue of Apartheid sport into America for 
the first time. South Africa's treatment of Ashe outraged American opinion 
and brought home the crudity of this system. His ban had an enormous 
impact on world opposition to South African sporting contacts.B4 
The Ashe Affair combined with the threat of demonstrations to the 
Davis Cup culminated in the United States Lawn Tennis Association calling a 
special meeting of Davis Cup nations for March 23. Because fears that 
South Africa's inclusion would endanger the competition in boycotts and 
visa problems- South Africa was excluded.BS The exclusion from the Davis 
Cup must not be confused with International Lawn Tennis Federation the 
controlling world body. Due to the undemocratic structure of the ILTF South 
Africa remained an affiliated member. Four countries (United States, Britain, 
France and Australia) had 12 votes each followed by some countries who 
had eight votes and others with four or two votes. African countries were in 
the lowest category of associate members and had no votes. Britain, 
France and Australia were all traditional sporting allies of South Africa, so 
resolutions for white South Africa's expulsion were defeated by a majority of 
votes from a minority of countries.B6 
By 1970 white South African sport was facing near complete isolation. 
Opposition to South Africa's sporting policies had steadily grown since the 
early 1960's and by 1970 most countries if not opposed were drawn for an 
opinion. South Africa's expulsion from the Olympic movement illustrated the 
extent of world opposition and had the further significance of expelling 
South Africa by constitutional means. 
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In the Republic's cherished sports of rugby and cricket, contacts with 
sympathetic opponents ended when militant tactics were used successfully 
over persuasive pressure or legal means for the first time. 
The protest movement had begun in South Africa, and with expulsion, 
spread internationally. It had developed organisationally and co-
ordinated effective protest action. Expulsion of South Africa from each 
sporting body and the total isolation of South African sport were accepted 
common aims. By constitutional means and militant protest action this large 
movement was closing the door on South African international sport. 
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Chapter Three 
THE ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE 
. ( 
In 1970 New Zealand's All Blacks were invited to tour South Africa. The 
'-r invitation received, did not explicitly include racial qualifications and left 
,, selection entirely in the Rugby Unions hands. But after the cancellation in 
1967 due to South Africa's acceptance of a white-only team it became 
accepted only a team selected on merit would be possible. All recent All 
Black tours of South Africa had raised this issue and each protest became 
l progressively louder until in 1967 the Government stepped in indemnifying 
New Zealand's position beyond doubt, giving the NZRFU no option but to 
decline. Since 1960 public opinion increasingly rejected exclusion of Maoris 
from representative teams, in 1967 the Government affirmed a similar stance 
and the Rugby Union, like it or not, had to swallow it. New Zealand stood 
firm, in no way would it import racial discriminatory policies in choosing its 
national teams. All teams in the future must be selected on merit alone. 
Yet this was not 1967, it was 1970 and a lot had happened since then. 
South Africa, suspended from the Olympics in 1964, was again in 1968 and 
finally expelled in early 1970. South Africa had refused tennis star Arthur Ashe 
visa entry, raising a storm of protest in America. The Springbok tour of Britain 
erupted into violence and demonstration, and Hain's STST threatened 
worse if the South African cricket tour proceeded. Numerous other South 
African sporting bodies faced expulsions, suspensions or protest. 
So, South Africa, if New Zealand accepted the invitation, required a 
major policy change allowing a multi-racial team to tour. But how did New 
Zealand deal with this tour and why was there renewed protest vigour 
,,. against a tour where the previous contention of merit selection was satisfied? 
An examination of the views taken in regard to the tour is necessary. 
The loudest voice opposed to the tour continually reiterated the tour 
should not proceed at all. It was primarily led by the pressure groups 
Citizens Association for Racial Equality. (CARE) and the student driven Halt All 
Racist Tours (HARD whose opposition to South Africa's Apartheid system was 
the fundamental 'raison d'etre' of these organisations. 1 They were 
opposed to racial prejudice in all its forms both in New Zealand and 
1 See Chapter four for a full description of these groups. 
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abroad. 2 This quote from the late African Chief Albert Luthuli used by the 
Chairman of HART, Trevor Richards in a speech, epitomised their attitude 
toward apartheid. 
Do not deceive yourselves into thinking that racialism is just 
another tyranny like a political tyranny or religious tyranny. I 
know many men who have changed their religion and many 
men who have changed their politics, but I know of no man 
who has ever changed his race and that is the way to 
Armageddon, for racialism is the only absolute tyranny. 3 
Any contact whatsoever with South Africa and Rhodesia was abhorrent and 
only served to advance this absolute tyranny. (Rhodesia had, under the 
Smith Regime declared unconsistutionally its unilaterial Declaration of 
Independence and in 1970 renounced allegience to the British Crown 
declaring Rhodesia a republic. The United Kingdom considered this an act 
of rebellion asking UN member states not to recognise Rhodesian 
Independence. Due to defiance of, and isolation from the rest of the world, 
Rhodesia sought comfort from South Africa who gave aid in exports, imports 
and military assistance. Minority white Rhodesian leaders subsequently 
copied South African racial poilicies in formulating their own legislation.) 4 
Reform through the pressure of isolation however could be achievable. 
In the context of this debate, critics disputed this line. Many instantly 
, dismissed the idea claiming the practicalities in achieving total isolation of 
South Africa in an economic, social and political sense remained hopelessly 
idealistic.s The most convincing rebuttle came from Helen Suzman, South 
Africa's leading liberal politician. Asked if cancelling the tour to South Africa 
... would help the liberals cause (who championed against apartheid) in 
South Africa, she replied .. 
Boycotting South Africa would in no way alter the internal 
situation there.6 
Her reasoning was in two parts. Firstly, the only people that would think 
again, and then only in the narrow field of sport, would be white spectator 
sportsman, "therefore not changing things that matter"?. And secondly, 
2 
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cancelling the tour could in some cases be counter productive to the liberal 
cause in so far as actions against South Africa abroad tend to harden white 
opinion within the republic.s In spite of these views the advocates of 
isolationism maintained their views. 
In direct contrast to isolationism were those adamantly in favour of the 
tour. Inactive in the controversy, but most active in supporting the tour was 
the New Zealand Rugby Football Union. As in the past the Union resorted to 
its "no comment" stance. Any attempt to discuss the issue raised by the tour 
was met with a set formula "as on previous occasions we are not prepared 
to enter into any public discussion on the matter" in responding to discussion 
it was agreed by the Union it would "only stir up trouble", and besides, the 
Rugby union was to administer rugby and not engage in political discourse. 
This was outside the realms of its function. In regard to the tour it would only 
deal with the South African Rugby Board. As far as the Rugby Union was 
concerned, nothing but sport was involved in the tour.9 The provincial unions 
and individual rugby clubs followed the practise of the national union. No 
matter how vigorous the attempts by outsiders to extract the justifications for 
touring the Union remained steadfast and would not be drawn into the 
debate thus absolving itself from addressing the central moral issues.1o 
The closest the Union came to officially discussing the tour was in 
regard to the invitation. Due to the protests of 1960 and 1965 and the 
cancellation of the proposed 1967 tour the Union had this time secured an 
invitation from South Africa in keeping with the policy "No Maori No Tour". It 
-"" made anybody in New Zealand eligible and no racial guidelines were 
)- employed in selection. Rugby officialdom felt this was a more than 
t adequate resolution. Officials then became agitated at the continuing 
protest in 1970. They claimed the protesters had changed their ground - to 
the removal of discrimination in South African teams, so as to justify continuing 
the protest. 11 Beyond this contention, the Union remained tightlipped. 
Outside official circles a strong arg,ument in support of the tour, which 
grew steadily louder as the controversy developed was that which aimed 
8 Suzman to Innes May 15, 1970 (CR) 
9 Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.56-57 T. Newnham Oral Interval, 23 May 1990 
at 52 Customs St. East Auckland, 10 a.m. 
10 Ibid, p.57 











to keep politics and sport quite separate. It was used by a large cross 
section of the sporting community. From the quiet unobtrusive armchair critic 
to ardent and stolid sports fans. For most who refused to see beyond the 
touchlines of their field, politics had no part in the playing of sport. Politicians 
and Government belonged in the eschelons of bureaucracy, running the 
country, its exports, imports, economic and foreign policies and jostling by 
parties for political power. It had no place in the administration of sport, on 
deciding who plays who. Sport after all was a leisuretime pursuit whereas 
politics was the serious business of diplomacy- the two were poles apart. 
Driven by a competitive spirit and the thrill of victory, sportspersons had no 
time for political implications, nor did they believe them important. Keeping 
politics out of sport was, as far as they were concerned, a just claim. 
Others to push the same line included firstly, elements of the media as 
Wellington's leading daily The Dominion states, 
This is one sporting organisations affair, that even rugby's place 
in New Zealand life does not make an All Black tour an official 
act involving the Government, the people of New Zealand or 
anyone outside the field concerned. 12 
And secondly politicians themselves. Increasingly bureaucrats came to use 
this rhetoric. Norman Kirk M.P. and leader of the Labour Party in March 1969 
claimed, 
'the decision to tour lies with the NZRFU' 
and added 
'it is desirable that there should be no politics in sport' 13 
The front benches of the National Party echoed these sentiments. Deputy 
Prime Minister J.R. Marshal: 
The Government is not involved in the administration of sport 
and I believe that most New Zealanders would want to keep 
sport free from Government control or inteNention. 14 
and Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake: 
12 
13 
I do not believe and I am sure this view is shared by most New 
Zealanders that New Zealand Governments should interfere in 
activities of sporting bodies.1s 
The Dominion, May 2, 1970 p.12 (editorial) 
Norman Kirk Press Statement, March 25, 1969 (CR) 
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M.P's found using this argument was a skillful way of side-stepping the real 
issue. Keeping politics out of sport washed their hands of the problem 
without losing electorial support from the sporting public and had the 
double effect of making the NZRFU responsible for the final decision to tour. 
It was effectively a political cop out. 
To consider sport was, is, or ever will be kept out of politics is akin to 
imagining that avarice can be kept out of real estate or accountancy out 
of marriage. 16 Sport has been political since Pelops defeated Oenamaus 
in a chariot race and took his kingdom as part of the prize, or when Sparta 
used victories in the (ancient) Olympic Games as tests of her vitality and 
prestige. 17 And more recently when Hitler used the 1936 Berlin Olympic 
Games to exhibit Germany's Finest Aryans. The New Zealand Listener saw 
political implications in sport with a different slant again. 
To compete is to seek victory and the prospect of victory is 
exciting. But winning itself is the best of all for to be victorious is to 
be liberated from the threat of failure. Huge crowds as well as 
individual athletes can experience this sense of deliverance. 
Thus sport in a very real sense is akin to the pursuit of freedom. 18 
Within New Zealand and within rugby in particular sport and politics 
have invariably been mixed. It is customary to attribute informal diplomatic 
functions to touring sports teams. Of the 1949 All Black team to South Africa 
~ the team was considered "ambassadors and emissaries of New Zealand 




South Africa was the first of the two countries to cause serious divisions 
by bringing politics into rugby. In 1921 when a Maori team played the touring 
Springboks at Napier the local Daily Telegraph published a report by a 
South African journalist. It expressed outrage at the sight of Europeans 
supporting the Maoris against the white South Africans. Despite Maori and 
Pakeha opinion being unequivocally opposed to the South African 
viewpoint, New Zealanders continued to tolerate South Africa's dictation of 
the racial composition of the All Black teams touring that country. 2o 
lB Laidlaw, p.195 
17 The Listener, Oct 31, 1969 vol62 p.5 
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19 New Zealand Press Association Aprilll, 1949 :cited by Thompson, Race and Sport p.6 
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Because they were Maori, South African politics forbade All Black greats like 
George Nepia, Johnny Smith, and Naka Nathan from entering the Republic 
on the tours of 1928, 1949 and 1960 respectively. 
Having already experienced a tour cancellation due to political 
pressure in 1967, it may explain why agitated sports lovers used the "no 
politics in sport" drive, so feNishly without really understanding the whole 
picture, and while conspicuously reinforcing this line politicians remorsefully 
~· hid behind the transparent ideal for their own suNival. But as a valid 




adequately summerised herein. 
Rugby though an amateur game, 
Is Nationalism by another name, 
The lot of all our games these days it seems: 
For sport as everyone admits, 
To paraphrase Von Calusewitz, 
Is politics by more ferocious means.21 
Another proposition aligned closely with the no politics in sport issue 
was the sport for sports sake idea. It was based on the premise if the team 
goes it will do so to engage in a sporting contest, for no other basic reason. 
22 Again it was supported by the sporting public with numerous letters to The 
Dominion who pushed the same barrow. 
New Zealanders prefer to engage in international sport without 
conducting suitability tests on opponents other than their ability 
to compete.23 
It is worth pausing momentarily to consider more fully this argument, 
and indeed the no politics in sport contention for both are not totally invalid. 
If sport was played for sports sake only or divorced completely from 
politics, then any team could play any other team regardless of political or 
social considerations. This to a certain extent happens. The field of 
International sport pits East against West, right versus left, rich against poor 
and big against small and little politically is made of it. Countries compete 
against other countries whose political systems are disagreeable, even 
cold enemies without a voice raised. To this end politics are kept out of 
1 sport and the morality of sport exists in its own compartment. 
Why then, the sports world asked, if you let us play the oppressive 
21 Roger Woddis, The New Statesman cited by Laidlaw p. 196 
22 The Dominion, Dec 31, 1969 p.16 (editorial) 
23 Ibid, Oct 18, 1969 p.14 (editorial) 
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regimes of Spain or Russia will you not allow us to play South Africa? Unlike 
other countries South Africa's sports system is intricately bound to its political 
Apartheid system based on racism. It is uniquely abhorrent. In any other 
oppressive system sportsman have the option, albeit a limited one, to 
change their politics, it is not impossible. In South Africa, as Luthuli states, no 
man can change the colour of his skin. It is impossible. He suffers under an 
absolute tyranny. 
By far the most convincing argument which those in favour of the tour 
used is termed "the thin end of the wedge·. It was based on the premise 
that sending a mixed team (racially) to South Africa might show South 
African's that people of different races can successfully participate together 
in sport. In doing this it might begin to break down the Apartheid system. 24 
The acceptance of Maoris within the team as a concession was the aim, 
and as Mayor of Glen Eden, Dr H.E.A. Moody stated: 
Maybe, just maybe this is the thin end of the wedge and for the 
benefit of mankind we cannot afford to pass it over for we may 
be striking the first positive blow against Apartheid.25 
It was hoped the largest gains would be in breaking down 
segregated sport, with the additional effect of dismantling in some small 
way the Apartheid regime. Chris Laidlaw, All Black and Rhodes Scholar who 
toured with the 1970 All Blacks summarised the argument thus: 
Moreover I saw it as a chink in the armour of apartheid through 
which a wedge could be driven resulting in a progressive 
tightening of the conditions under which we, the rugby world at 
large would be prepared to play rugby against South Africa. It 
was in short, the basis from which further concessions would be 
won and the gradual dismantling of Apartheid in sport 
achieved.26 
It was a strong case. Up till then no precedent had been set whereby a 
multiracial sports team had played in South Africa. South African 
Government policy had disallowed it. The Arthur Ashe and Basil D'Oiiveira 
affairs vividly revealed the extent South Africa would go to preserve 
Apartheid. Yet it appeared the gate was open. For the first time a non-
racially selected team was allowed to tour the Republic. Optimistic 
questions were asked. Had cracks already appeared in Apartheid before 
24 The Dominion Apri14, 1970 p.10 co13-4 (letter) 
25 The Herald, March 26, 1969 (CR) 




the team arrived? How much more would these cracks widen with the 
arrival of the All Blacks. Helen Suzman endorsed this argument adding she 
was ·against isolating South Africa and hopes to obtain reform from within."27 
What benefit the tour would have had on segregated sport 
remained a moot point. On the one hand, the skeptics denied any benefit 
whatsoever. They held that any pseudo-pragmatic notion that a bi-racial 
tour may help to break down Apartheid was myopic.2a Listener 
correspondent Pamela SeareiL who had recently visited South Africa 
claimed, 
But seeing how short a time it took me to become colour 
conscious I could understand the feelings of a South African 
born, bred and educated in superiority. No visit by a few 
Maoris to his country is going to change his attitude to coloured 
people and anyone who thinks it will be deluding himself. 29 
Further South African authorities had implied the inclusion of Maoris in the 
team, did in no way show a weakening of their racial policies, and, while 
the All Blacks were in South Africa these three conditions applied: 
1) That the New Zealand side does not create any internal difficulties for 
the South African Government. 
2) That politics should be kept out of sport 
and most importantly, 
3) That sport should not be used as the thin end of the wedge for other 
motives. 30 
Vorster had already declined entry to Arthur Ashe for contravening these 
conditions and would only allow the All Blacks if he felt there would be no 
damage to the existing regime. 31 Thus the express intent of the tour as "the 
thin end of the wedge" so held those in favour. was flatly denied by South 
African's themselves. 
On the other hand, however, were those who believed the tour may 
have achieved the desired result. Laidlaw, who was later to change his 
views on touring, found it; 
Heartening to be told by several hard-lined Afrikaners that they 
had been convinced before the tour that multiracial sport, 
'Zl Suzman to Innes May 15 1970 (CR) 
28 
29 
The Listener May 23, 1970 vol 61 p.6 Oetter) 
!bid, AprillO, 1970 Vol63 p.10 (letter) 
oo The Dominion, May 29, 1970 p.2 col1-5 
31 lhld. 
) 
regardless of where, or by whom it was practised was 
physically and emotionally impossible.32 
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And added the example set by the All Blacks must in the long term have 
had an educative effect. 
Branching from "the thin end of the wedge" argument came a further 
contentious issue. Concerns had arisen in New Zealand that Maori players 
and supporters travelling around the Republic might be subjected to the 
oppressive racial laws, or that whites of the touring party would be treated 
better than non-whites. Leading this query was the New Zealand Maori 
Council. (NZMC) Before giving consent to the tour the council required to 
know "whether or not the principle of equality between Maori and Pakeha is 
maintained."33 In March, 1969 the Consul General for South Africa, Mr P.H. 
Phillip gave the assurance the Maori Council needed stating "all will be 
treated as New Zealanders without discrimination".34 In view of this "clear 
and cordial statement" the president of the New Zealand Maori Council, Sir 
Turi Carroll announced Council support for the tour.3s 
The announcement immediately drew widespread criticism and 
claimed in according Maoris the same rights and privileges of South African 
whites, the Maori were being given "honorary white• status. That South 
African beneficence extends to a single occasion only, a tour of South 
) Africa, and no promises are held out to Maoris who wish to travel to South 





licences of rapid expiry". 36 When the tour finishes suddenly Maoris become 
brown again curtailing under the auspices of apartheid once more. Thus 
the concession accepted by the Maori Council is not a concession at all 
but "cynically conceived temporary accommodation."37 
The controversy in 1970 was uniquely different than previous years. The 
contention of racial discrimination in New Zealand's selection policy, to 
everybody's satisfaction had been removed yet the problems continued. 
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difficulty were still faced with protest action. Consequently arguments 
claiming "no politics in sport", and "sport for sports sake", became louder as 
sports people tried to fend off the moralists. However for those who listened 
rationally to both sides of the argument, 1970 posed a brand new question 
which involved choosing one of two alternatives, either -
or 
refuse to tour at all in the hope that enforced isolation would 
provoke a breakdown in apartheid 
maintain contacts in order that direct persuasion could take 
place with rugby acting as the catalyst.3a 
The evil was no longer racial discrimination at home but the practising of it in 
South Africa, in selection of its sport teams and apartheid in general. 
Important in understanding· the effects of the 1970 tour, was the 
debate in South Africa. With rugby union holding the same revere in South 
Africa as in New Zealand the cancellation of the tour could have serious 
political implications which South African Prime Minister, Vorster, knew well. 
Yet tampering with the Apartheid system to accommodate a rugby tour 
held equaL if not stronger political risks. Numerous precedents had been set 
preventing the inclusion of coloured players in touring teams to South Africa 
with D'Oiiveira's demise exemplifying the Republic's obdurate stance. 
The problem for Vorster was two-fold. Firstly due to circumstances in 
New Zealand, South Africa in order to preseNe rugby ties had to accept a 
team selected on merit only, risking the distinct possibility of Maori's being 
included in the All Black touring side, and second, Vorster had to placate the 
hard line Africaaner Nationalists within his party who insisted on absolute 
Apartheid dogma. The situation remained delicate. In ApriL 1967 Vorster 
delivered a major policy speech interpreted as making possible the visit of 
Maori rugby players to the republic or members of the All Blacks.39 He 
claimed, in the past Maori rugby players had toured South Africa and were 
received in the traditional respectable manner. 
It is true that in the 1929 (All Black) team which toured South Africa, 
there was at least two people with Maori blood while the 1949 
team there were at least three with Maori blood. We 
accepted these people and treated them like any number of 
the New Zealand touring team, there were no problems or 
38 Laidlaw, p.l90 




The claim was totally erroneous 41 and fabricated by Vorster to serve his 
political ends. By asserting that Maoris had already toured South Africa, 
allowing them in 1970 would be no different, and in keeping with normal 
practise. By 1969 Vorster received support from Waring, the Minister of Sport 
and Dr Donie Craven president of South AFrican Rugby Board who 
claimed, 
New Zealand will pick their best team and irrespective of who is 
in the team they will come on tour. 42 
However the ruling Nationalist Party was developing increasing divisions. On 
the one hand were the hardliners known as Verkramptes (the cramped 
ones) representing the interests of Afrikaner manual workers and poor whites 
and looked to maintain Apartheid in its purest form while advancing Afrikaner 
Nationalism. On the other were the more pragmatic and reformist Verligtes 
(the enlightened ones) who represented the middle class and professional 
liberal Afrikaners.43 At the Transvaal Nationalist Congress in September, 1969 
Albert Hertzog, leader of the Verkramptes and ten other delegates voted 
against Vorsters sports policy. Hertzog said of it-
the question that troubled him was that if Maori's came with the 
All Blacks they would take part in social activities with white South 
Africans. They will sit at tables with our young men and girls and 
they will dance with our girls. If Maori's were allowed into South 
Africa with these rights, it might be said by coloured students at 
the University of the Western Cape that they were being 
discriminated against if they were not afforded the same · 
privileges as the "Uitlander" Maoris. Dancing with white South 
African girls would set a precedent and would become the thin 
end of the wedge. If you have that wedge once in a door 
you can never close it again.44 
For the Verkramptes, a multiracial touring team unacceptably comprised 
the principles of Apartheid. A week later, fearing a dangerous split within 
Nationalist ranks was imminent Vorster called for an early general election. 
He said, 
Nothing can ever damage us more than if the outside world 
were to get the idea that there is not a strong Government in 
40 The Dominion, April13, 1967 p.1 Col1-4 
41 Ibid, Nov. 6, 1969 p.43 col4-7 
42 Ibid, Nov.24, 1969 p.l col2-3 
43 Omer-Cooper, p.219 
44 Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid, p.52 
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power in South Africa. 45 
On October 25, Hertzog broke from the National Party and led a thousand 
delegates to Pretoria, where they formed the Herstigte Nasionale Party (the 
Reformed National Party). With little time to organise the HNP faired poorly in 
the election, failing to win even a seat. It continued nevertheless, as a 
significant extra-parliamentary voice condemning government reforms 
from a standpoint of white racist extremism .46 
With the split by the HNP and their subsequent defeat, the tour based 
on Vorsters principles looked safe. He had conceded enough ground 
regarding Apartheid doctrines to allow Maori rugby players, without losing 
vital support in the Volksraad, and Vorster, as a safeguard set New Zealand 
the priviso not to play politics when selecting its team. Such a proviso left 
Vorster free to read the political temperature in South Africa and, if it suits his 
cause to announce an evidence of agitation in New Zealand, the tour is off 
" because New Zealanders refuse to abide by the conditions he has set. 47 
Vorster had insured his position, with a power of veto from any real threat that 
may follow a possible HNP swing. 
,. 
Ironically or not, the All Black tour of South Africa had helped to 
precipitate open conflict in South African politics to the point of division. Why 
Vorster chose to relax the principles of Apartheid sport specifically with the All 
Black tour remains difficult to tell but seems probable the importance of 
rugby, being the national sport, may explain the change. Having suffered 
expulsions in other major sports, South Africa had to compromise its laws or 
allow the cherished rugby relationship with New Zealand to evaporate. 
What is extraordinary about the debate in both countries was while it 
concerned exactly the same issue - Apartheid sport, in New Zealand the 
argument centered on the best way to dismantle apartheid sport, yet in 
South Africa the argument concerned the preservation of apartheid sport. It 
was a most unusual paradox. 
45 Lapchick, p.150-151 
46 Omer-Cooper, p.219 




PROTAGONISTS, ANTAGONISTS AND FENCESITTERS 
An examination of who became embroiled in the controversy reveals three 
distinct groupings. Those who were uncompromisingly in favour of the tour, 
those who were unequivocally opposed and by far the largest group were 
those that lay somewhere between the two. For the first two groups the 
battle lines are clear, but division in the last group is not so distinct. What is 
certain however is that everyone had an opinion. From the pub to the 
boardroom, few could escape the tour issue, be it a debate in the school 
lunch hour, an argument at the rugby club, the subject of a hui or the sermon 
at Sunday service - involvement became compulsory. 
On one side of the fence developed a loosely bonded community 
in opposition to the tour. The movement was led by two pressure 
organisations totally committed in their opposition to the tour. Citizens 
Association for Racial Equality (CARE) was the oldest and largest of the two, 
remaining at the fore-front of the protest. Halt All Racist Tours (HART) was a 
new organisation whose objective was specifically concerned with 
"' Apartheid sports tours. There were distinct similarities between each 
organisation as there were differences. Each then, will be dealt with 
separately. 
Citizens Association for Racial Equality was set up in October, 1964. It 
was formed as an association to promote racial equality and coined the 
felicitous acronym CARE at its first meeting. 1 The stated aims of CARE were 




To promote research into all aspects of Race Relations in New 
Zealand and to help educate public opinion in matters of racial 
equality. 
To oppose racial prejudice in all its forms both in New Zealand and 
abroad. 
To give support to the Defence and aid fund for the succour of those 
convicted by South Africa's Apartheid laws. 
4) To persuade the New Zealand Government to take a stronger stand 
1 M.P.K Sorrenson Ten Years of CARE p.3 
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against Apartheid at the United Nations.2 
It was often thought by those looking in that CARE's only interest was the 
prevention of rugby tours, largely due to 'the increased press coverage 
-~ they received because of rugby's high profile image. But while the South 







In the years leading up to the 1970 campaign to stop the tour CARE 
achieved a number of small successes. It launched a strong and effective 
campaign against the tacit support the New Zealand Government was 
giving to the Smith regime in Rhodesia.3 It was the only Pakeha based 
organisation that made submissions in opposition against the Maori Affairs 
Amendment Bill which was quickly tagged the "last great land grab".4 And, 
after continuous government inaction CARE set up New Zealand's first 
Citizens Advice Bureau on July 19, 1967.5 CARE also saw as its duty the 
policing of race discrimination within New Zealand and in 1970 through 
constant lobbying in conjunction with other organisations, helped to 
formulate New Zealand's first Race Relations Council. 6 
The Council, to which CARE became closely associated, aimed to 
promote and extend the understanding, co-operation and harmony 
between races.? It was launched at a two day conference and 
representatives from the Maori Womens Welfare League, CARE, NZUSA, and 
the Northern Drivers Union were among those present. a Despite having the 
respected personalities Sir Edmund Hilary and Professor Quentin Baxter9 
among its patrons, the press quickly condemned it. 10 The Dominion said of 
the council 'it has adopted the ·negative isolationist" policies of the extremist 
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short it was CARE in a new guise. Jim Gale, a CARE member, and newly 
elected president of the New Zealand Race Relations Council answered 
these critics swiftly. The criticisms were unjustified. They failed to consider that 
not two, but thirty other organisations are affiliated to the council. That the 
councils has taken up activities once the concern of CARE was not an 
attempt to superimpose this organisation but was due to parallel aims. 12 
The Race Relations Council was one of CARE's most significant successes 
and helped to convince skeptics that CARE was not anti-rugby but had 
stronger and wider motives. 
These were the main achievements, but other examples exist. They 
helped to build the confidence of CARE as an organisation. Tom Newnham 
the Associations Secretary for many years recalled of their successes 'it was 
the small victories that kept you going.'13 
As a pressure group CARE never intended becoming a large 
organisation. From the outset the members regarded themselves as 
"catalytic agents", aiming to initiate a movement not generate it. 1 4 
Consequently numbers remained small. A year after conception 
membership stood at 133 and at CARE's high point, reached approximately 
1,000.15 It comprised of teachers, politicians, clergy, trade unionists, 
sportspeople, current and former rugby players, students and even 
businessmen. The components of its membership enabled CARE to 
influence a large community. 16 It featured prominent citizens, including MP's 
Mat Rata and Mrs Whetu Tirakatene-Sullivan. The Anglican Bishop of 
Auckland, Bishop Gowing, University of Canterbury lecturer Richard 
Thompson, Sir Edmund Hilary, and All Black forward Ken Gray to name 
some. 17 The high calibre of these citizens coupled with the broad 
community base, projected for CARE a credible and respectable public 
image on which to protest. 
By 1970, CARE had kindred organisations bearing the same name in 
Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin. Each center was 
12 Sorrenson, p.13 
13 Newnham, Oral Interview 
14 Sorrenson, p.4 
15 N ewnham, Oral Interview 
16 Newnham, Oral Interview; Thompson, R. Retreat From Apartheid p.55 
17 CARE records- various letters. Newnham, Oral Interview 
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autonomous and controlled their own protest action, while Tom Newnham 
the Auckland based secretary was accepted as the national spokesman.1a 
/ 
In their actions, CARE aimed to appeal to the broad middle ground 
which subsequently limited protest options. Still, within constitutional limits they 
sought to exploit every avenue at their disposal, short of violence. 19 'It may 
have been violence if you call spraying football pitches violence' 2o stated 
Newnham. Yet civil disobedience was rare and CARE's protesting drew 
upon conventional methods of marching, demonstrations, petitions, 
deputations, speeches, protest letters and the like. Through organising the 
forces of protest in this way CARE created opportunities for citizens to voice 
their objection in a respectable and meaningful way. 
CARE was a voluntary organisation.21 It elected a conventional 
committee consisting of a president, secretary, treasurer and general 
committee of seven who perform the necessary functions in running the 
"' organisation on a voluntary basis. This work entailed the endless 
i correspondence in received and answered letters, organising and 
partaking in speaking engagements, supply of material on racism both in 
New Zealand and abroad, meetings, advice, the co-ordination of the 
various protest activities and the regular production of newsletters. The 
commitment needed of those close to the center was very substantial and 
needed long hours of unpaid work in order to maintain continued action. 
On a wider scope than ever before, and in accordance with CARE's 
fourth stated aim, the organisation expanded its international rapport with 
' ~ other countries and equivalent organisations. The protest against the 1970 
tour greatly expanded CARE's international contact. In 1968 at the United 
Nations Human Rights Conference in Iran the local newspaper "The Tehran 
Journal" featured an article on the New Zealand Federation of Maori 
Students conference at which a motion was carried to the effect that even if 
Maoris were to be included in the side they were not to go to South Africa. 
Dennis Brutus, active campaigner and president of SAN-ROC saw the article 
-r and wrote his congratulations and support.22 This overseas recognition 
lB Ihld., and Thompson, Retreat From Apartheid p.89 
19 N ewnham, Oral Interview 
ID Ibid 
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effectively started the domestic campaign against the 1970 tour. 
CARE established close links with Australian pressure groups and 
worked together to co-ordinate protests and share information. In 1969 
CARE and their Australian counterpart jointly organised a speaking tour for 
Dennis Brutus. The tour included both countries which had the double effect 
of allowing Brutus to reach a greater population and reduced expenses 
having two countries pay his way, not one. The New Zealand protest 
movement established a working dialogue with Britain at a time when both 
countries were embroiled in South African tour issues. In England young 
Kenyan born Peter Hain had just led STST in successful protest movement 
which CARE and HART watched closely. 23 Later in June, STST assisted the 
" New Zealand campaign and organised pickets outside New Zealand 
house in London. 24 
The last of the major international contacts were the African 
"' organisations. The African National Congress (ANC), the South African Rugby 
r-
,::-
Federation (non racial SARF). The South African non-Racial Olympic 
Committee (SAN-ROC), the South African National Olympic Committee 
(SANOC)25 and lastly the United Nations from which came the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights used by CARE as a basis for their protest. 26 The 
International support strengthened CARE's domestic argument. It revealed 
to the public the controversy of race, sport and politics was not unique to 
New Zealand. Organised opposition toward South Africa's Apartheid sports 
policies had become worldwide. 
In New Zealand, CARE attempted to obtain support from the 
controversies major players. With the Prime Minister, Sir Keith Holyoake they 
maintained a reciprocal dialogue. CARE secretary, Newnham consistently 
wrote to Holyoake questioning him on the tour issues. It was alleged 
Holyoake replied personally, remaining "scrupulously attentive" to what 
CARE was saying. His answers however circumvented the issues and he 
preserved his non-committal stance. CARE and HART never again had this 
-r same close correspondence with future Prime Ministers.27 
23 Hain, p.ll 
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Discourse with the NZRFU remained virtually nil. Despite attempts to 
seek information CARE found themselves unliked and unwanted. The union 
clammed up immediately when CARE began to pry and those at the top 
normally refused to comment. 28 The university students on the other hand, 
were very co-operative and helped CARE in organisational matters, 
protesting equipment and bolstered crowd numbers on all occasions. 
The students in fact, bring the second pressure group into focus. In 
May 1969 Trevor Richards, a political studies student and International Affairs 
Officer of Auckland University Students Association formed an umbrella 
organisation specifically concerned with the question of Apartheid sports 
tours.29 At the meeting the name HART (Halt All Racist Tours) was decided, 
this being their solitary aim. Although HART looked for support from CARE, the 
trade unions, churches, Maori groups, and internationally based 
associations the majority of the support in these early years came directly 
from student sources. 30 By late 1969, HART had branch offices in all the 
University towns with Richards being the National Co-ordinator. 31 Besides 
this HART had little formal organisation on membership. Richards took the 
attitude 'If 2,000 people turn up for a demonstration in Auckland then those 
2,000 are members of HART.32 
In the beginning HART took its cues from the violent but successful British 
'Stop the Seventy Tour Campaign' . Needless to say HART was considered 
the more extreme of the two pressure groups in New Zealand. 33 Apart from 
a demonstration on United Nations Day 1969, when 2,000 people marched 
through Auckland. 34 HART, during the 1970 campaign was ostensibly, finding 
its feet, and as a protesting force did not develop till later, reaching its zenith 
in 1981. 
To assess how successful the pressure groups were, remains difficult. 
Opinion polls as a device for taking the public temperature on issues were 
not in use and people's reckoning is all that is offered. Newnham believes 
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public opinion may have started at less than 25% and by June, 1970 
although grown considerable, would not have approached 50%.35 CARE 
and HART as pressure groups were new ideas. Indeed demonstrating on 
this scale and frequency was new, thus their acceptance varied. CARE 
appealed to a broad middle ground. HART was a more militant student 
driven group. Both worked closely together throughout the campaign, 
functioning as societies conscience - a nagging reminder of its moral 
obligations. This was the aim they drove at, fully committed despite facing 
overtly stubborn resistance. 
On the opposite side of the fence was the New Zealand Rugby 
Football Union. The Union saw itself as a responsible and private body. It 
was elected by and answerable to the affiliate provincial unions. It was an 
administrative body and saw this as its prime function. 36 From the first 
constitution its stated object was 'to foster and control Rugby Footbal1.37 To 
promote, encourage and administer rugby in the way it believed best. 
Those who elected the Council expected this 38. The Union on receiving 
the invitation from South Africa, duly accepted it. Union officials, as 
previously stated withdrew from public discussion adopting a 'no comment' 
attitude. If pressed the NZRFU through its Chairman, Jack Sullivan would 
pedantically reiterate the tour procedure. 
I will remind everyone that the NZRFU accepted an invitation 
from the South African Rugby Board to tour this year. The 
position is very clear. The itinerary is accepted and made 
public. Trials were being arranged for May the venues being 
decided.39 
Of course there was no compulsion to enter the debate, the NZRFU knew 
this, stating, it went beyond its jurisdiction to do so.40 Anyway the battery of 
.., rugby supporters surrounding the NZRFU willingly offered any necessary 
> comment. 
', 
In response to the pressure groups CARE and HART rose a right wing 
anti-demonstrator backlash movement. Organisations like the Friends of 
35 Newnham. Oral Interview 
oo Redpath, p.23 
38 
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South Africa, the Association Defending South African Tours (ADSAT)~. The .... 
South African Friends Association and most sinister of aiL War Against 
Recreational Disruption (WARD) aimed to encourage sporting contacts 
between New Zealand and South Africa and disrupt any demonstrations 
that might threaten these contacts. 41 
The Friends of South Africa was considered the mildest of these 
" groups. The leader Barry Delamore claimed "en masse the blacks have 
•-..- not yet reached the genetic level of the European·. It had the widest 
support claiming one former Cabinet Minister and various opposition MP's.42 
i 
i, 
ADSAT looked to confrontational measures in achieving their aims. Bruce 
Thompson the Associations prime mover "believed rigidly in Apartheid the 
threat of world communism, the jewish conspiracy and the evils of black 
emerging nations.· The organisation planned to meet demonstrating with 
counter demonstration disruption preventing any insults hurled at the visitors 
by a noisy minority of agitators, and having night watchmen at sports 
grounds.43 The Southern Africa Friends Association which claimed a 4,000-
5,000 membership believed that 70% of the population favoured the tour. 
The Chairman Lieutenant-Colonel A.C.R. Elderton also supported Apartheid 
but was not he maintained, a racist. He believed HART and CARE invented 
a racial situation that 'does not exist'.44 The most extreme group, with an 
openly belligerent policy was WARD. Advocating direct action and "no 
mucking about with demonstrators· WARD was the self-appointed guardian 
for the rights of spectators. In offering white-coated stewards to assist the 
police and Rugby Unions with protesters, New Zealand came perilously 
close to experiencing the brutal "rugby vigilante" witnessed in Britain.4s 
The majority of pro-tour supporters though did not align themselves to 
these extremist groups yet had no difficulty in expressing their views. 
Demonstrators were tagged as 'creeps' 'rubble rousers', 'agitators' even 
likened to "inverted Klu Klux Klanners·. 46 Threats were not beyond some as 
this letter to Newnham suggests. 
41 Laidlaw, p. 195 
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Observation of your actions makes it clear you have a 
problem. The symptoms are classic but it is possible that a 
competent psychologist may be able to do something for you -
I hope so .......... l will continue to deal with people as I wish and 
you interfere with me at your peril.47 
63 
Clearly rugby was their major concern not moral issues, and any one who 
threatened this was met with frustrated abuse. 
A significant voice in the controversy came from the South African 
Consul-General P .H. Phillip. Not only did he provide an assurance to the 
Maori Council but actively championed the policy of Apartheid in New 
Zealand. He provided a rational framework for sports bodies within New 
Zealand to identify, when justifying a tour of South Africa. 48 He was accused 
of setting up whispering campaigns against Dennis Brutus,49 and his voice 
was heard 'selling Apartheid' to the New Zealand public. 5o When CARE 
wrote letters to Phillip demanding answers to the leading moral questions 
concerning the Apartheid system the Consul General remained 
conspicuously silent. 51 In response to Phillips outspokenness came a threat 
to kidnap him. The caller said it 'was a means of compelling the New 
Zealand government to stop the All Black tour of South Africa this year' .52 This 
threat was one of many during the controversy. They tended to be aimed 
at those groups either determinedly for or against the tour but never came 
to anything. 
For most protagonists, deep moral considerations were of no 
concern. Their interests were in rugby, and while openly discrediting the 
Apartheid system neither believed or wanted to believe a rugby tour would 
have wider implications. For the majority, rugby, in particular this tour, had no 
equal paramount- it was supreme. They were as absolute the tour would 
proceed as the protesters were to stop it- more so. There vested interest 
allowed for no other consideration. Many however saw the issues 
differently. Unobscured by a blind feNour for sport, many took time, and 
weighed the options before coming down on one side or the other, when 
47 T.A. Stewart to Newnham, 30 May 1970 (CR) 
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they did, to their surprise or disappointment they opposed their workmates, 
Whanau or friends. The community it seemed had divided. 
In 1960 when the All Blacks toured South Africa the church was 
considered the ·vanguard of protest• ,53 having initiated the controversy 
over Maori exclusion from the rugby side to tour South Africa in 1960. Church 
support, it was said, helped to legitimize the protest movement. 54 However, 
the appearance of unanimity amongst churches in opposing the exclusion 
of Maori players from New Zealand teams was to some extent an illusion, 
protected by the silence of those who were unconvinced or in favour of the 
tour under any conditions. 55 1970 differed because cracks covered over 
by silence then, were exposed now and the unanimous facade no longer 
stood. 
The division of whether to tour or not came not from a neglect of their 
moral duty as they 'all abhor apartheid'. and hence 'start from the same 
side'.56 But in how they attempted to show their opposition. Some 
believed the only way to exert influence on South Africa was to cut out all 
cultural relationships, while others saw sending a fully representative team as 
doing some small thing to breech the dreadful wall of separateness. 
The major church groups had taken different sides. The Roman 
Catholic hierarchy and (predictably) the New Zealand Marist Rugby Council 
supported the tour despite the catholic press being strongly opposed to it. 
57 The Anglican and Presbyterian Churches were hopelessly divided on the 
issue. While the associated churches of Christ, the Society of Friends, and 
the Methodist Church remained totally opposed.58 Not surprisingly at the 
annual meeting of the National Council of Churches in August 1969, no 
statement by the NCC with regard to the situation as a whole was passed.59 
Both sides of church opinion was publicly visible. On the one side 
were those opposed, Anglican Bishop of Auckland, the RT Rev. E.A Gowing 
consistently opposed the racial restrictions in previous South African tours and 
53 Redpath, p.42 
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said so publicly. He gave his support to the opening of the National 
campaign to stop the 1970 tour in August, 1968. Invited by CARE and in 
conjunction with the president of the FOL Mr Skinner, Bishop Gowing also led 
a deputation representing over 30 organisations to meet the Prime Minister 
urging the government to disassociate itself from the tour. tJJ Others to take a 
public stand were Rev. Ted Buckle, Executive Officer of the Diocese of 
Auckland,61 the Bishop of Dunedin, the Rt Rev. Walter Robinson 62 and the 
New Zealand Student Christian Movement.63 
On the other side, the prominent Bishop of Aotearoa Rt Rev. M.A. 
Bennett supported the tour wholeheartedly. At a Rotary Club function 
... Bishop Bennett expressed his hope that Maori players are chosen to tour 
and Maori people go as spectators. The Bishop believed the tour should 
go ahead because he "still held to the biblical assessment that the main 
element in human relations was goodwill". "Let us· he claimed ·exercise this 
goodwill in places where goodwill is lacking.· 64 The failure of the NCC to 
make a comprehensive statement on the tour was not an oversight. 
Churches were divided on the issue and this division was unwelcome, 
.~ 
seNing to unsettle the unity of each congregation. Some churches refused 
any comment as they feared the depth of division which might become 
apparent. 
From early on the Maori community was divided. These divisions 
created by the tour exposed a further split within ty1aoridom, one of young 
and old, or, correspondingly radical and conseNative. The debate began 
in earnest when the New Zealand Maori Council announced its support for 
the tour. 65 
The NZMC was set up by the 1962 Maori Welfare Act. It was the national 
body heading Maori Associations that were established in most Maori 
communities. 66 The Council was dedicated to the purpose of 'bettering the 
conditions of New Zealand's Polynesian peoples and fostering 
00 
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understanding and goodwill between all New Zealanders'.67 Henare 
Ngata one of its most prominent members claimed of the Council -
'by its very constitution the New Zealand Maori Council is rurally 
orientated. It is conseNative and is relatively free of the tensions 
which appear to be emerging in urban situations 'Race' and 
'Colour' evoke no angry connotations, only the relatively mild 
emotions associated with the "Maori : Pakeha" relationship". 68 
Later in the same article Ngata described the Council's attitude to rugby 
contacts with South Africa. 
It need hardly be said that the New Zealand Maori Council 
opposes Apartheid, however, from the Maori viewpoint the 
primary issue involved in past, cancelled and proposed tours 
of South Africa, is not Apartheid in that country, but rather the 
removal of any hint of it here. Previous tours had always thrown 
into question the validity of the proposition that racial equality 
existed here, not so much because Maoris were excluded 
from such tours but because the Pakeha citizens of this country 
had acquiesced in that exclusion. The cancellation of the 1967 
tour demonstrated at last that by and large, a great deal of 
goodwill towards the Maori people did exist among 
Pakehas.69 
Before the NZMC gave its consent to the tour, it required a firm 
assurance from the South African government that Maori supporters 
travelling with the All Blacks would be granted visas and treated no 
differently. to other travelling New Zealanders. 70 This assurance came 
through Consul-General, Mr P.H. Phillip in a letter claiming: 
The individual members of any group of rugby supporters 
arriving in South Africa from New Zealand will enjoy exactly the 
same facilities that is to say that they will all be treated as New 
Zealanders without any discrimination.71 
In light of this 'clear and cordial statement' Sir Turi Carroll the Council President 
announced the Council's support for the tour. 72 The announcement had a 
double effect. It separated the old Maori from the new, and mobilized a full 
and determined campaign against the tour . 
68 
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The Council when accused of supporting the Apartheid regime 
offered two further justifications for their stance. Firstly, by supporting the tour it 
would encourage coloured South Africans to work for improved conditions. 
73 Secondly it believed that the tour would make a crack in the walls of 
Apartheid and may bring a little more 'Aroha' to the grim situation in South 
Africa.74 In a predictable result the Maori Advisory Board of the NZRFU voted 
emphatically in support of the tour. It stated. 
The view was unanimously held by all Maori people in all areas 
represented by the 10 Maori members of the board.75 
In addition to these council approvals came support from famous 
Maori individuals who had travelled to South Africa. In 1964 Maori rugby 
players, Ralph Love and Pat Walsh returned from South Africa singing its 
praises, claiming the South African's had been 'overwhelmingly generous'76. 
Maori operatic bass lnia Te Wiota who had visited the Republic on three 
occasions said of his treatment 'I was received like a European and I went 
into their homes and was everywhere treated magnificently. 77 This 
hospitality and pointed politeness shown to these and other New 
Zealanders however served to momentarily accommodate these guest 
for if South African law was strictly applied the Maori visitors would be 
segregated altogether. It was a one-off exception. In order not to lose 
Maori support and threatened further tours the South African's laid out a red 
carpet. 
The first Maori organisation to express opposition to the tour was the 
New Zealand Federation of Maori Students. Syd Jackson having passed a 
motion that Maoris should not tour South Africa at all, then opened the 1970 
campaign in Auckland. 78 From the start Jackson had a clear understanding 
of the central issues. He understood that, 
73 
Maoris would travel in a New Zealand team in that country for 
the entertainment and also the ego satisfaction ot the white 
minority ...... Maori players will be given only artificial and 
hypocritical equality ... Our country should assert its capacity to 
make moral decisions. It should not, for the sake of 
The Dominion, April 1, 1970 p.ll, Col 5-7 
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expediency, deny the tradition of harmonious race relations 
that we have built up. What is morally wrong cannot be 
politically right. 79 
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Soon after the Maori Council decision Jackson, his wife and a 
busload of University of Auckland Maori club members including Peter 
Sharples and Toby Curtis (both of whom are now prominent in Maori 
leadership today), set out for the Bay of Plenty and East Coast regions in a 
bid to discuss on Maraes, the rationality of the Council's decision. The idea 
was a brave one - the young Maori students saw for themselves the 
problems they face. 
"we were kids and who were we to think we knew better than 
the adults. ·so 
Their acid test came at Gisborne where the young contingent were against 
the big guns of Maori leadership on the East Coast. Leaders like Henare 
Ngata, Arnold Reedy and George Marsden, all members of Maori Council 
were skilled in the art of Maori debating and very compelling orators.a1 After 
the student deputation had spoken with convincing rhetoric, the elders 
replied. One by one they stood and spoke, but not on the topic to which 
this young deputation had addressed as they could not refute what had 
been said, but on unrelated topics. They mesmerized the whole issue so it 
would not require a vote and they succeeded. It was a victory in the art of 
Maori politics.82 
Although the deputation failed to reverse the elders decision it did 
leave an impact on the community. Many on hearing these fresh insights 
began to question their own rationale. In terms of the key issues - a start had 
been made. It also exemplifies the different attitudes between old and 
young Maori. The students spoke briefly, on the key issues, and in English the 
elders replied on unrelated topics for longer and in Maori - and won. The 
Maori students living in the cities and having access to knowledgeable 
sources lacked the ability to impart their enlightened ideas upon their elders. 
Maori opposition to the Council decision went further than the students. 
' From early on Maori Women opposed the tour. The Maori Women's 
79 S. Jackson,'Should we Go" Te Kaunihera Maori. Autumn 1969, p.17-19 







Welfare League had very powerful speakers in Mira Szaszy, Meremere 
Penfold and Shalima Vimbau of Auckland and Elizabeth Murchie, the 
president of the League from Dunedin. They immediately rose to the 
theme of basic human rights for all and featured prominently in numerous 
demonstrations. They also belonged to CARE.83 
Notable in the Maori Women opposition was Carol Fleet who 
returned from overseas to take up the fight. Shortly before the All Blacks left 
Fleet donated $1,000.00 to organise a last-minute Maori rally at Te Unga 
Waka Morae in Auckland. Three hundred representatives showed from 
various Maori organisations and called for an urgent meeting of the New 
Zealand Maori Council to reconsider its decision.84 Despite failing in its 
objective, this powerful gathering organised at short notice by the League 
highlighted Maori women's commitment against the tour. 
The four Maori MP's came out strongly in opposition. The most vocal 
opponent was Southern Maori representative Whetu Tirikatene-Sullivan. She 
led demonstrations to the Prime Minister, openly endorsed CARE and HART, 
and staged her own protest by boycotting an official government function 
in honour of a visiting South Africa delegation, for which she received a minor 
reprimand from the Prime Minister. 85 Matiu Rata, Koru Wetere and Paraone 
Reweti all stated their opposition without committing themselves to the same 
extent. 
The Maori Organisation on Human Rights (MOOHR) became very 
active in anti-tour demonstrations. Largely through the efforts of secretary 
Tom Poata, MOOHR was itself seen to repetitively question the wisdom of 
the tour keeping itself prominent in the public eye. As the name suggests 
MOOHR was equally involved in other pertinent issues. 86 Finally, Maori 
intellectuals expressed disapproval. Bruce Biggs professor of Maori studies 
at Auckland University condemned the "I'm All Right" attitude taken by the 
New Zealand Maori Council. 87 Other Maori organisations to oppose the 
tour were The Maori Graduates Association. The Ratena Youth organisation 
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Inc. and many Maori committees over which the Maori Council resides. 88 
Division touched everyone, with the trade unions being no different. 
Throughout the tour debate the unions official stance remained unchanged. 
Union leadership maintained their opposition as stated at their Annual 
Conference in ApriL 1969. 
The FOL cannot support the sending of an All Black rugby union 
football team to South Africa when black workers are 
prevented by law from organising with other workers. 89 
A year later at the 1970 annual conference the president of the FOL Mr Tom 
Skinner reiterated the FOL strong opposition and added that as an industrial 
movement the FOL should 'do as much as it could to embarrass the whole 
situation regarding the All Black tour of South Africa' 90 and 
We must stand by our principles and do as much as we can to 
show that we will not tolerate discrimination.91 
The FOL asked of its trades councils and affiliated unions to initiate and 
actively support opposition to the tour. 92 It also pressed the government 
and particularly the Prime Minister to inteNene and stop the tour. The time 
had passed when the government could continue to shelter behind the 
fallacious argument, that action on its part would be interference with sport. 
93 If, claimed the FOL an All Black tour proceeded the ramifications on New 
Zealand would be very great. New Zealand would bring on itself 
international pressures and boycotts and "our reputation for believing in 
human rights is completely discredited."94 
With little over a month before the All Blacks departure, Tom Skinner, 
supported by the Engineers and the Wellington Drivers Unions 95 proposed 
the FOL take direct action in the form of strikes and boycotts of anything 
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these measures to be impractical, saw Skinner withdraw this idea.96 The 
leading delegates of the FOLand especially president, Tom Skinner and 
secretary W.J. Knox remained emphatically opposed despite open 
challenges. These challenges came from both inside and outside the 
unions. 
In September 1969, Ron Don the Chairman of the Auckland Rugby 
Union openly questioned the validity of the official FOL claim. Don 
believed if a secret referendum was taken among members of all affiliated 
Unions it would 'tellingly show that a great many people not directly 
involved in rugby are in favour of the tour'. Skinner replied in saying he was 
prepared to organise a postal ballot among all workers under his 
federations jurisdiction to determine their feelings about a proposed tour. 
However Skinner required an assurance that the Rugby Union would call off 
the tour if the workers decided the All Blacks should not go. At this point Don 
claimed these were only his views and not representative of the Rugby 
Unions at which point both parties drew back. 97 
Don's suspicious that the FOL was not unanimous in its approach were 
borne out in the affiliated unions. The Wellington branch of the Railway 
Tradesmen Association openly disassociated itself from the FOL's 
oppositionist view. Their reasoning was based upon the FOL's inconsistent 
attitude. 
As the FOL's policy on Vietnam was that New Zealand should 
not be involved in the internal policies of another nation this 
view should also apply to South Africa. 98 
Inconsistencies were also noted by trade unionists in the FOL's failure to 
oppose the tours of South Africa by the New Zealand bowlers and athletics 
teams.99 Shortly before the All Blacks left, the National Drivers Union also 
distanced themselves from the FOL as they deplored the FOL's intervention 
in matters of any international sport. 100 
Further evidence of union division on the tour issue came from the 
pressure groups. CARE attempted to appeal to workers at lunchtimes on 
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the job yet they discovered most workers were in favour of the tour. 101 
Division within the trade unions was deep. While the leadership resoundingly 
echoed their opposition the rumblings of disagreement could be heard 
from beneath. 
In a formal capacity the Universities chose to oppose the tour. At the New 
Zealand University Students Association (NZUSA) Easter Council meeting a 
remit was moved to 'cut off sporting contacts with South Africa and 
Rhodesia'. All associations present voted in favour, save Lincoln. There was 
very little discussion on the matter.1 02 A second motion proposed "that 
NZUSA do contact CARE and other organisations and people concerned 
with the sport and South Africa issue, with a view to establishing an 'ad hoc' 
body whose sole raison d'etre is the cessation of the 1970 All Black Tour·. This 
second remit was important as it suggested some ·worth while action to 
implement NZUSA's attitude.· The resolution was passed with the only 
dissension again being Lincoln.1 o3 
This reluctant, semi-committal approach by NZUSA can be explained 
by its suspicion that the 30,000 students it represented were not united in their 
stand. Evidence of a split opinion was difficult to find for 1970 but the same 
issue caused massive rifts within universities in 1973 and 1981. 104 And, with the 
dissension of Lincoln on each remit and a conspicuous lack of discussion 
overall, the prospect of division beneath the surface seems likely. 
Students could however express their disapproval of the tour 
individually or through other organisations (HART, CARE, Student Christian 
Movement) and contributed enthusiastically in protest action, their youth 
and enlightenment overcoming inhibitions. 
The African Students Association in New Zealand took a firm stand. 
President Henderson Tapela stating, 
if the New Zealand teams play sport with countries that flaunt to 
the world their repugnant racist policies, then we must accept 
that we are on enemy territory and we must keep alert.1os 
Tapelas strength of opinion was supported by his student body. One 
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Tapela was thoroughly committed to the protest effort. 
At the center of the debate were those it concerned, the sports 
players and officials. Most who supported the tour believed they were 
'unbiased sports loving, big hearted, New Zealanders. 1oa However this 
appraisal is misleading and like other community groups, the sporting 
community was divided on the issue. 
Of the All Blacks in contention for the tour, not all were unanimous. 
Certainly the majority of players supported the tour, with their reasoning as 
diverse as their position. Colin Meads the most senior of the selected All 
Blacks based his support on rugby issues, and his belief for continued rivalry 
between South Africa and New Zealand. To Meads, South Africa presented 
the greatest challenge to the rugby tourist. 109 Flanker, lan Kirkpatric took the 
familiar "no politics in sport• line 110 while Fergie McCormick would play the 
game against any country including South Africa, 'or even Uganda if ldi 
Amin invited me.'l11 Bryan Williams and Sid Going two of the four coloured 
players to tour with the All Blacks (the other two being Henare Milner and Blair 
Furlong) believed in the efficacy of a multi racial team playing and touring 
together, a line halfback and Rhodes Scholar Chris Laidlaw also took. 112 All 
Black and Maori winger George Skudder claimed if selected he would go 
to South Africa not as an honorary white but as a Maori. He was not 
selected.113 Significantly though were the players that declined to tour. 
The most dramatic and unexpected refusal came from test veteran 
Ken Gray. Having previously played South Africa in 1965 Gray experienced 
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Apartheid.114 Bob Burgess, later to become an All Black also withdrew 
because of his views on the ... 
'South African Government's policy of Apartheid and the way 
sport is run there'll5 
Oppositionist views were also held in the rugby world at large. National 
representatives to come out in protest included; Andy McMillan (Ireland), 
John Taylor (Wales), Bert Toft (England), and six Australians who announced 
their repugnance for Apartheid sport simultaneously.l16 Although small this 
voice was conspicuous in light of its rebellious nature. 
Sports persons in the wider field were also divided on the All Black tour 
issue. Giving support for the tour was former Wimbledon tennis champion, 
Ann Jones, claiming Maori players, would be welcome in South Africa,117 as 
was local tennis ace Richard Hawkes, having just returned from the 
republic.118 Gary Player the world class professional golfer continually 
reiterated his full support 119 and Graham Smith the National Welterweight 
boxing champion showed his, by travelling to South Africa himself. 120 
The New Zealand Amateur Athletic Association (NZAAA) opposed the 
tour and moved to cancel a tour by South African athletes in January 1970. 
121 Chairman Ces Blazey stated the association 
would not want to put in jeopardy the participation of other 
New Zealand sports representatives in the Commonwealth 
Games.122 
The NZAAA's moral garden was not all roses however and vested interests 
motivated the decision. If the South African's had toured, the NZAAA stood to 
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Zealand's opportunity for hosting the 1974 Commonwealth event.123 There 
were however other New Zealand representatives who refused South 
African tours on principle, including; Susan Vaughan (hockey) John Lowes 
(Softball) and Rod Dixon (Athletics).124 
Most sports persons though plumped for 'the no politics in sport' theory 
and, if pressed generally supported the tour. This reflects to a degree the 
revered position sport maintains in New Zealand, where moral 
considerations, intrinsic to everyone, are overlooked for the sake of a 
game. 
One person who became unintentionally involved was Chief Justice, 
Sir Richard Wild. At a rugby club function Justice Wild told the attentive 
audience he was 'certain the All Blacks will fly to South Africa.12s and 'the vast 
majority of New Zealanders have admired the way the NZRFU has carried 
the whole business through'. 126 He brought a cheering crowd to their feet. It 
became an unfortunate slight for Justice Wild and attracted widespread 
criticism most notably from Sir Leslie Munro in parliament. 
"I regard it as unfortunate that the Chief Justice should have 
expressed his views on what is a highly controversial matter. We 
can guide our own consciences on this problem and I am sure 
the Chief Justice will recall the observation of the later lord Atkin 
that justice is not a cloistered virtue.· 127 
Editor of The Listener Alexandra Mcleod continued the point. Justice Wild 
had spoken in a public place on a contentious issue which divided his 
countrymen. "Inevitably name and office coalesced in the public mind'. 
And taking a side was 'not the way to preserve a reputation for objectivity 
and impartiality'.128 CARE took no time in exploiting Wild's predicament. In 
letters to the paper, Newnham criticised the Chief Justice of New Zealand for 
giving aid and comfort to the Queens enemies, (Rhodesia). The 
accusation caused Justice Wild considerable anguish and he ceased 
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Examining who was involved in the debate would be incomplete 
without looking at the media. The way it reported the events, its strengths 
and limitations. The key source for this study was the daily newspaper The 
Dominion which will thus be the medium examined. 
The media, claimed Newnham, was very influential in bringing the 
publics attention to problem areas and issues. For a pressure group, being 
so small, any publicity was good publicity. Too often however it was 'any' 
publicity, as newspapers frequently ran impressive stories about a 
demonstration. They featured dramatic accounts of protesters' exploits, 
supported by revealing photographs but little on what the protest was 
about. It was, in short, sensationalising and not informing. While recognising 
this CARE still looked to gain useful exposure. 130 
The Dominion was guilty of unbalanced reporting on two counts. First 
by deliberately not printing material holding contrary views to its own. In 1969 
CARE commissioned a full page appeal to the NZAAA to stop the tour of 
New Zealand by South African athletes. The Dominion, after initially 
accepting the appeal at the eleventh hour refused it thus being too late to 
place the advertisement elsewhere. 131 In a similar incident T. Poata, 
Secretary for the Maori Organisation on Human Rights wrote a letter 
expressing concern at the non-publication of their letters. Of four letters sent 
to The Dominion only two were published with one having been abridged. 
Poata accused The Dominion of failing to report democratically.132 On 
learning of this misreporting a deputation of Wellington citizens approached 
The Dominion who then agreed to accept such advertisements in future.l33 
The Auckland Star was also found guilty of misreporting. 134 
The second count concerned subtle slants The Dominion showed in its 
reporting. Through constantly featuring articles on the success of Apartheid, 
life in South Africa, sporting and political scene in the Republic and featuring 
large advertisements of South African companies, The Dominion worked on 
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of an issue, in bold black letters read 'SOUTH AFRICAN BLACKS PREFER 
APARTHEID' following this in small lighter letters read 'NZ tourist says'. The story 
concerned an 80 year old New Zealand tourist just returned from the 
Republic. He is quoted: 'the blacks are very happy and would rather live· 
this way under white rule.' 136 The frequency of these reports was constantly 
maintained. 137 
To gauge how much the public was influenced by biased reporting is 
beyond the scope of this study. What can be said however is the intention 
was there to influence. For those who knew little about the controversy it 
undoubtedly had the educative effect desired. The media then, was 
persuasively involved . 
The issue left few untouched cutting across established lines and 
boundaries within society. Those that followed rugby had an opinion, those 
that defended morality had an opinion, the churches and trade unions 
were asked for an opinion. If you watched television or read the 
newspaper, you had an opinion. As the central issues had expanded so 
did the impact on New Zealand. With the controversy growing in intensity 
and heat attitudes hardened on both sides causing conflict. To consider 
who had a majority remains difficult but what can be said is - the All Blacks left 
a divided nation. 
1:£ Ibid, April 2, 1970 p.4 col 5-6 
137 Ibid, Dec 5, 1969 p.9 col 3-4 and June 3, 1970 p.21 coil 
80 
Chapter Five 
STOP THE TOUR: AN OUTLJNE OF THE PROTEST 
1- Protesting in New Zealand was not new. Reaction against Vietnam helped 
by United States unrest, saw the emergence of marching and banner-
waving previous to 1970. In response to the ~·No Maori No Tour· controversy 
pressure groups were inaugurated and traditional methods in petitions and 
persuasive letters were expanded. 1970 saw a consolidation of these 
}-
techniques. 
After the 1967 proposed tour was cancelled the issue of South African 
sporting contacts faded, discussion almost ceased.l CARE had to 
remotivate and energize a society whose concerns with race and sport 
had lulled. The opportunity arose when Dennis Brutus wrote to Jackson 
acknowledging his stand against the tour, which precipitated the opening 
of the campaign. 2 Of even more significance in mobilizing a disinterested 
public was the D'Oiiveira affair. On September 24th 1968 the MCC decided 
against a tour of South Africa because it refused to comply to South Africa 
demands and exclude D'Oiiveira from the English cricket team. 3 
The news instantly hit the headlines. Observers in New Zealand saw 
ominously close parallels to the possible inclusion of Maoris in the All Blacks. 
The tour looked doomed, but most importantly for CARE, South Africa was 
back in the headlines. 
CARE recognised early that the central issues of 1970 were not 
domestic but involved the policies within South Africa, which the majority of 
New Zealanders knew little about. There was a need for information. So 
CARE, in conjunction with Australian pressure groups, invited Dennis Brutus to 
New Zealand on a speaking tour on Apartheid and sport in 1969.4 CARE had 
chosen its speaker well. Brutus was highly articulate and through his works 
with SAN-ROC had become well informed on South African affairs. For two 
weeks in February and March, Brutus travelled the country handling up to 
1 Newnham, Oral Interview 
2 Brutus to Jackson May 6, 1968 (CR) 
3 Hain, p.82 






five engagements a day.s He addressed meetings throughout the country 
speaking to church and Maori groups, parliamentarians, trade unionists, 
university and school students. Thousands more heard Brutus on radio and 
television and most daily newspapers ran extensive feature profiles and 
published his addresses.6 
Brutus had a profound effect on those who listened. He opened 
peoples eyes to South Africa's racial problems making many re-evaluate 
their opinions. Some, so inspired by his rhetoric, determined to actively do 
something and questioned the Government who, on the one hand 
allowed continued sporting contacts with South Africa, yet on the other 
preached platitudes about racial equality.7 Even The Dominion who 
criticised Brutus for attempting to use rugby as 'a weapon with which to beat 
the South African Government' conceded he was an 'eloquent reasoning 
opponent of Apartheid' and applauded his motives stating 'his mission will 
not be quickly forgotten.'B 
The Brutus message drew close parallels between the tyrannous 
system of apartheid and the rise of Hitler. He states 
No one can read the history of the rise of Hitler without 
recognising the clever exploitation of prejudice for what were in 
part at least, economic and political reasons. In South Africa 
racism is quite clearly used in order to keep people at low 
levels of earning power. So the crude concept of economic 
exploitation has got something to do with it. 9 
Brutus was not optimistic about a peaceful resolution 
'What we are left with in the last resort is the black people 
abandoning their fifty years of passive resistance and non-
violent struggle and turning to arms. This they have begun to 
do.' 1 o 
The impact Brutus had on the protest movement was dramatic. He 
rekindled old fires and lit many new ones. CARE offices opened in 
Wellington, Christchurch and Nelson while the Auckland office was inundated 
5 The Listener, March 14, 1969 vol 60 p. 13 
6 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.38 
7 Ibid 
8 The Dominion, March 4, 1969 p.lO coil 
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with requests for speaking engagements and inteNiews. 11 The Brutus tour 
had satisfactorily achieved CARE's aim of education. 
In March of 1969, the New Zealand Maori Council announced its 
support for the tour, prompting Syd Jackson to lead a deputation of 
students through the East Coast - Gisborne area in a bid to reverse the 
decision. As previously explained they failed in their objective but did 
enlighten people on the contentious nature of the topic. 
In the meantime Trevor Richards emerged with the concept of an 
umbrella organisation devoted primarily to stopping the tour. HART began 
at Easter 1969 yet by September was still floundering through lack of support. 
The opportunity to expand HART came with the arrival of Judith Todd and a 
second speaking tour. 12 
Todd was the daughter of Garfield Todd the New Zealand born 
former Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia.13 Although quietly spoken she 
had an acute grasp of international affairs and was highly articulate. Todd 
spoke largely on the evils of the unconstitutional Smith Regime in Rhodesia 
and its oppressive racial policies which paralleled South Africa's Apartheid 
system. The tour lasted five weeks travelling to major and minor centers 
around the country. 14 Before every address Trevor Richards informed the 
large audiences of his new organisation HART. Both speaking tours were 
highly successful and equipped the public with a well informed appraisal of 
the issues at hand. 
Over the next few months protest action against the rugby tour fell 
quiet but the issue of apartheid sport and South Africa remained. Every day 
reports appeared in the newspaper of disruptions and violence in England 
where the Springboks were touring. 1s Back in New Zealand, South African 
golfer Gary Player experienced similar difficulties. On November 6th, 
several busloads of demonstrators mounted a vocal protest at a 
tournament in which Player was involved. Urged on by their peers, 
protesters invaded the golf course requiring the police to remove them by 
11 Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.38 
12 Sorrenson, p.ll 
13 The Dominion, Sept 23, 1969 p.5 col 2-4 
14 Sorrenson, p.ll 
15 The Dominion Nov 7, 1969 p.1 col2-4 
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force. 16 CARE who disassociated themselves from this protest, later 
discussed with Player Apartheid sport. From the ensuring interview Player 
admitted for the first time that non-white golfers who reach the required 
standard should be allowed to compete in the South African Open Golf 
Championship. His declaration made headlines in New Zealand and South 
Africa.17 
The NZAAA was still jostling with the option of inviting South Africa to New 
Zealand. In the face of mounting opposition from within the NZAAA and 
public alike the NZAAA withdrew the invitation. 18 Up till now protest action 
had remained persuasive, however from the early months of 1970 a distinct 
change in protest action occurred. It became more intense and grew in 
militancy. 
The first demonstration of note occurred on the 19 March. Students 
and young workers demonstrated outside the South African Consulate as a 
prelude to a larger protest held a week later in commemoration of the 
Sharpeville-Langa Massacres; where 83 peaceful protesters were killed. 19 
Two weeks later a demonstration, of greater significance to the tour, was 
held outside the NZRFU offices. Among the hundreds of Victoria University 
students were community heavyweights, Jim Knox Secretary of the FOL, 
Whetu Tirakatene-Sullivan MP for Southern Maori, Paul Grocott President of 
NZUSA, Trevor Richards, President of HART, and Tom Poata Secretary of the 
Maori Organisation of Human Rights. 
Protest pressure was applied to the NZRFU and Government but also 
included those self-acclaimed supporters of the tour. After the indiscretion 
by Justice Wild in support of the tour, protesting began outside his house. 20 
The next day Victoria University Students, having marched to the Wellington 
Town Hall where the NZRFU was holding its AGM turned their attention to The 
Dominion offices shouting "racist rag" due to The Dominion's stance on the 
tour.21 On the 7th May, Bishop Gowing and Tom Skinner led a deputation 
representing over 30 organisations to meet the Prime Minister urging the 
16 1Jllil 
17 Newnham, Aimrth~id is not a G!!m~ p.44 
lB Ibid, p.45 
]9 The Dominion, March 19, 1970 p.21 coil 
ID Ibid. April 30, 1970, p.l coll-4 











government to disassociate itself from the tour and refrain from giving the All 
Blacks any official farewell. Newnham, who presented the Prime Minister 
with an official statement concluded it .22 
When the United Nations Special Committee on Apartheid feels 
it necessary as it did on April 14th last, to specifically name New 
Zealand in a Special Communique to remind this country of its 
responsibilities in this matter there can be no doubt that in the 
eyes of the world our attitude to Apartheid is equivocal and 
suspect. In the circumstances, we submit that there is an urgent 
need for you to make a clear statement of condemnation of 
Apartheid sport and to disallow those New Zealanders who 
participate in rr .23 
It fell on deaf ears. The following day Holyoake announced, the 
government will not become officially involved in the All Black tour and 
affirmed government plans to arrange the customary farewell reception for 
the All Blacks at Parliament Buildings. 24 Clearly, the message was not 
getting through. Words had become ineffective and action was needed. 
Most of the extreme measures taken were unrelated to the official 
pressure groups, CARE and HART. On May 8th six men were caught by 
police inside the NZRFU house attempting to take documentation relating to 
the All Black tour, 25 and a few days later the covered grandstand at Athletic 
park caught fire around 10 p.m. at night in suspicious circumstances. 26 The 
first incident was admitted as protest action while the second was strongly 
suspected to have been. 
CARE and HART publicly announced their intentions to protest. The first 
major demonstration was at the All Black trials in Wellington. The police 
immediately called for reinforcements.27 120 extra police were brought in 
for the first All Black trial in Palmerston North, to control 90 protesters who 
marched onto the ground. 28 But worse was to come. A day preceding 
the main All Black trial in Wellington the headlines across The Dominion read 
~ Newnham, A:uartheid is not a Game p.47 
23 1hld._ p.27 
24 Thid 
25 The Dominion, May 9, 1970 p. 6 col6-7 
~ Ibid. May 12, 1970 p.1 col 5-7 
'Z7 Thid, May 20, 1970 p.1 col 5-6. 
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"Massive Security Plan for All Black Trials Tomorrow" 29 Police numbers were 
double that in Palmerston North and Athletic Park was kept under 
surveillance overnight before the trial. 30 In the morning newspapers the 
following day, HART president, Trevor Richards appealed to protesters to 
remain non-violent and bear in mind the long term goal before indulging in 
any illegal action. 31 His plea was to no avail. 
Police had to contend with a bomb hoax and, early in the second 
half 50 protesters leapt over the fence, raced onto the field and stopped 
the main trial for five minutes. Spectators were left in no doubt to the 
invaders intentions as the first man onto the field carried a banner 
proclaiming 'NO RACIST SPORT'. While removing protesters, the police 
made 17 arrests. 32 
In a related incident a caller rang Athletic Park and said a man would 
burn himself in a nearby park if the game continued. Soon afterward a car 
pulled up at the park and a man began walking across the grass carrying a 
yellow gallon tin. As police closed in, he doused himself from head-to-foot 
with petrol. He was tackled by police, stripped of his clothes, wrapped in a 
blanket and taken to Wellington hospital where he received treatment for 
petrol burns.33 
The disobedience continued. During the night on May 25th the 
Headquarters of the Auckland Rugby Union was set on fire with a molotov 
cocktail causing $5,000 damage. Disapproving reactions came from all 
corners. Tom Newnham condemned the action as 'criminal and cowardly' 
however The Dominion stated while Newnhams comments may have 
been sincere, 
in a controversy as heated as this one on how countries can 
most effectively react to South Africa's racial policy of Apartheid 
it is inevitable that an idiot fringe will resort to violence. The 
protest groups have to consider that their campaigns will 
appeal to extremists.34 
This was true to an extent. Leaders of minority pressure groups can use 
29 Ibid, May 22, 1970 p.1 col 5-7 
ro .Ibid, May 22, 1970 p.1 col 5-7 
31 .Ibid, May 23, 1970 p.1 col1-5 and p.6 col4-7 
32 Ibid, May 25, 1970 p.1 col1-4; Newnham, Apartheid is not a Game p.48 
33 Ibid, May 25, 1970, p.1 col1-4 
34 !bid, May 26, 1970 p.14 col1 (editorial) 
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violence to bargain with formal authorities and all other members of society 
by saying: 
"You must accept our just complaints and you must deal with us, 
otherwise, we will not be able to control our people".35 
While playing this role, the group is not unhappy of a malicious act or two by 
a few psychotic teenagers. The irresponsible elements are, of course, 
disowned, but the bargaining power of the leader and cause is enhanced. 
36 While this situation did not apply to CARE the same cannot be said for 
HART whose chairman admited to militant activity. 
On May 27 two petitions were heard in the Parliamentary Petitions 
Committee. The first was organised by Dr P.W. Hohepa and the second 
organised by Trevor Richards.37 Both petitions were ... 
"Praying that parliament states its support for the principle of 
racial equality in sport and urges the government to ask New 
Zealand sporting bodies to examine their overseas tour 
policies.38 
Dr Hohepa's petition which collected 7 AOO signatures, claimed that despite 
the New Zealand Maori Council's decision the majority of Maoridom is 
against the tour. The concession that Maoris can be included is expensive 
as they go under an 'honorary white' premise.39 Richard's petition on behalf 
of HART collected 12,209 signatures, and their principle reason for opposing 
the tour was moral. He stated 
the only way to achieve anything was through sports boycotts. 
It was not before but after the MCC had said they would not be 
going to South Africa that South African sportsmen had sought 
changes. 40 
Both petitions were referred to the government for consideration at 
which point they disappear. 
While protest action continued along conventional lines there were a 
number of individual protests of a different character. In one example a 
Wellington dairy-owner fed up with the anti-tour movement took his own 
35 M.L. Nieburg "Users of Violence" Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol. VII 9March 
1963) p.5 cited by Thompson, Retreat Then Apartheid p.90 
Ibid 
~ The Dominion, May 28, 1970 p.5 col1-7 
:13 Appendix to the Journals House of Representatives, 1970 Vol. IV H.31-1 I.1 p.3 
39 The Dominion, May 28, 1970 p.5 col1-7 







public opinion poll of 310 people. Questioned he found 218 were pro, 48 
anti and 34 undecided. Despite claiming his customers were' a fair cross-
section of the community' his dubious sampling techniques raise questions 
over the validity of the results. 41 
In another, Wellington bookseller Mr Roy Parsons sought a writ of "Ne 
exeat regno' (not leaving the realm) to restrain the All Black team from 
going to South Africa as it "would be gravely prejudicial to the interests of 
New Zealand". However the writ was not issued because it lacked a 
precedent case and was unsuitable in contemporary law. In his judgement 
Mr Justice Hardie-Boys said the writ of 'ne exact regno' was used for high 
political purposes in Elizabethan times and in the nineteenth century had 
become an instrument for restraining debtors. 
But even so on matters of state this court would in my view be 
usurping the functions of the Queens ministers in New Zealand if 
on the application of a private citizen the court in the name of 
the Queen in a matter of this kind permitted its writ to issue. In the 
absence of clear authority or precedent I decline to do so. It is 
accordingly refused.42 
The day after Parsons filed his writ. Ken Gray announced his shock 
retirement because of his personal beliefs on apartheid.43 
As the tour departure drew nearer the civil disobedience continued. 
A goal post on Lancaster Park was sawn down with six slogans in large letters 
being painted on the front two grandstands. And on June 5th, protesters 
were ejected from the courtroom in Wellington for noise abuse as the 
Athletic Park demonstrators were facing charges. 44 
Later at a farewell to Blair Furlong, one of the four coloured players to 
leave, Bishop of Aotearoa Manu Bennett, stated that sporting contacts with 
South Africa should end if the All Black tour did not ease Apartheid.45 This 
comment prompted CARE secretary Newnham to change his ground and 
support Bennett and the tour if the Rugby Union or the Government would in 
turn agree that this would be the last tour based on Apartheid rugby. 
Newnham was criticised widely for his change in position. The Rugby Union 
41 
42 
Ibid, June 6, 1970 p.56 col. 5-6 
Thid, June 9, 1970 p.2 col1-7 and June 10, 1970 p.9 col1-5; Newnham, Apartheid is not a 
~p.50 
43 The Dominion, May 31, 1970, p.2 col. 1-4 





was a sports administrator and to expect it to consider the racial or political 
implications behind competing against opponents exceeds the job asked 
of them.46 The issue quickly died however, as neither, the Rugby Union nor 
the Government bothered to respond. 47 
On the 11th June, two days before the scheduled departure, 
Wellington witnessed the most spectacular protest of the campaign. CARE 
commissioned sky writer Mike Brannigan to write the words STOP THE TOUR in 
huge letters across the sky. The weather was perfect and a brilliant clear sky 
with no wind made for a dramatic effect. 48 
That night at the parliamentary farewell to the All Blacks, seven people 
were arrested as they surged through Parliament grounds booing the 
departing team and throwing paint and flour bombs at guests. There were 
40 police on hand to control the situation. 49 
With only a day till the All Blacks left it was all or nothing for the protest 
movement. That night police and protesters clashed when demonstrators 
chanting slogans and carrying placards held up traffic in downtown 
Wellington for up to two hours. Police had to remove them forcibly and in 
doing so arrested 34 people. so The next morning at 5 a.m. 250 protesters 
marched from Victoria University to Wellington airport. There they joined 
many others totalling close to 1,000 demonstrators. Added to this were 
hundreds of tour supporters and 300 police. Tension was high as the parties 
waited for the All Black bus to arrive. To everyone's surprise the bus went 
round the terminal on to the tarmac on straight to the waiting plane. While 
the protesters began their vocal chants protester Tim Shadbolt leapt over a 
fence and raced towards the aircraft, only to be brought down not by 
police, but a pro tour supporter. Shad bolt refused to pay his fine and 
seNed one month in jail. 51 The All Blacks had left and the protest failed. 
Why did it fail? There appears no definitive answer. Certainly the 
protest movement did not have the support in numbers that it needed. 
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however in the final analysis anti tour sentiment seems well below fifty 
percent. Those that actively protested, significantly less again, leaving a 
small troop to fight a much larger army. It was, however a lively troop. 
Protests were more frequent and louder than before, civil disobedience 
and the disruption of sporting occasions became commonplace and over 
70 arrests is testimony to a determined more militant struggle. The targets of 
protest were many and varied. Not specifically the NZRFU and Government 
but individuals, and companies, or anyone who openly or actively 
supported the tour. This wide target area may have reduced the potency 
of their message. Unlike Britain's STST campaign, the New Zealand protest 
did not have continuing game venues on which to focus a sustained 
protest. Organisers had only a handful of All Black trials, and a few days 
when the All Blacks were together before they left, in which to stage a 
protest while national attention was focused upon them. Further, if 'direct 
~ action' was the most effective tactic HART not CARE was capable of 
., leading it. But CARE, the moderate citizens group, not HART, the youthful 
~ militant group, led the 1970 campaign. By world standards the protest was 
a moderate one not rising to the storms of violence seen elsewhere. By 
New Zealand's standards it was a most troublesome sport associated 
protest to date. Though behind the rest of the world, it was clear, in regard 










Until 1970 protests in New Zealand against racial discrimination in sport were 
wholly domestic. For this All Black tour however the issue was not against 
racial discrimination here, but objection to its formal presence in South Africa. 
The dissent in New Zealand to Apartheid sport, and Apartheid in general was 
enhanced by growing world hostility against South Africa. The determined 
campaigning by the London based SAN-ROC organisation had woken the 
world conscience to South Africa's inhumane sporting policies which were 
incongruous to the central sporting value of fair play. In response to this 
South Africa was expelled from the Olympic movement and later the Davis 
Cup. In England, Ireland and America, militant protests and violence 
occurred in opposition to visiting white South African sports teams. Each new 
development received substantial press coverage and educated the 
New Zealand public in the evils of Apartheid and the world abhorrence of it. 
Furthermore New Zealand pressure groups CARE and HART had become 
part of a loosely structured wider international movement against Apartheid 
sport. And by inviting Judith Todd and the president of SAN-ROC, Dennis 
Brutus to speak to the public at large, CARE had imported the international 
movement into New Zealand. 
But this All Black tour differed somewhat. New Zealand had obtained 
a concession from South Africa never before allowed - to enter the republic 
with a multi-racial team. It introduced new possibilities on how best to 
achieve a breakdown in Apartheid. Some advocated no tour at all, 
hoping enforced isolation would bring about change. Others saw a 
multiracial team touring South Africa represented the thin end of the wedge 
and a basis from which further concessions could be won. With the 
implications of either option unclear, it became a question of tactics, to tour 
or not to tour, which would be better in achieving this aim? Opinion 
remained divided. Undoubtedly a large percentage of the sporting public 
aligned themselves for expedient reasons with touring as the thin end of the 
wedge. On the outside they claimed the All Blacks were moral crusaders, 
while on the inside gleefully rubbing their hands in anticipation of the rugby 
encounter. 1970 differed from the 1960 and 1967 protests where the sides 
were clearly divided. In this issue both pro and anti tour factors could have 











-Apartheid supporters remained indoors and did not join the protest 
movement. This significantly weakened its effect and played the major part 
in the failure to stop the tour. 
What successes then, did the tour achieve? Firstly the issue of Maori 
inclusion in the All Blacks ironically became the thin end of the wedge which 
split the South African National Party. The break by Hertzog's HNP extremist 
group ended full party unity, and separated those unwilling to compromise 
Apartheid dogma from those who were. That is not to say the National Party 
relaxed its Apartheid policy in fundamental areas and those laws remained 
as permanent as ever. Secondly the tour did become the thin end of the 
wedge regarding concessions in Apartheid sport. Due to near total sport 
isolation South Africa allowed gradual changes to take place within sport. In 
rugby for instance, the All Blacks played a coloured team in 1976 and by 
1981 the first coloured player was selected to tour with the Springboks. 
' And lastly, the distinguished performances by the coloured All Blacks 
, ·• may have dispelled for white South African's the notion that skin colour is a 
"" determinant of athletic skill. Bryan Williams excelled especially and was 
frequently named the 'star' of the tour. African's and coloured identified 
closely with Williams from early on. After the All Blacks second match at 
' " 
Kimberley cheering African's invaded the field and surrounded Williams for 
autographs. These gestures however were not appreciated by drunken 
whites nor were they legal and soon a full scale riot eventuated. If the multi-
racial All Blacks had delivered a message to South African's, the whites were 
determined not to let it flower. So while the tour recorded some gains they 
remained meagre and did not constitute the further concessions desired. It 
became clear South Africa's reforms in sport were not reforms so much but 
measures designed to placate world opinion and preserve its sporting 
contacts. How effective isolation would have been is difficult to tell, but the 
advantage of retrospect has shown that when internationally unanimous the 
isolation of South Africa has proven to be the best strategy in pressing for 
change. 
, ., For New Zealand however not playing rugby against South Africa was 
~ catastrophic. The "honorary white" issue exposed how central an All Black 
tour was to New Zealand when those in power could overlook this blatant 
injustice in order that we still see the All Blacks play the Springboks. Voluntarily 




inconceivable and moral issues were swept aside. Although the nations 
social conscience in regard to race issues was undoubtedly rising, New 
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